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Abstract 
There is little literature available that is specific to the use of wireless local area 
network (WLAN) security among small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) 
in South Africa. 
This research study developed a framework which may be used by SMMEs for the 
purposes of securing their WLANs. In view of the fact that the aim of the study was 
to develop a system for improving information technology security, the study 
followed a design science approach. A literature review was conducted on security 
control framework standards and WLAN technologies. The needs of SMMEs 
regarding WLANs were also established. 
The result of this process was an artefact in the form of a WLAN Security Control 
Framework for securing WLANs for SMMEs in South Africa. The suitability of the 
framework was validated by means of a focus group. 
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1.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the introduction to the research study. Section 1.2 describes the 
rationale behind the study and section 1.3 presents the problem statement. This is 
followed by the research questions in section 1.4 and the research objectives in section 
1.5. Section 1.6 summarises the research process, while section 1.7 describes the scope 
and delineation of the study. As discussed in section 1.8, there were no ethical 
considerations to be observed. The layout of chapters is presented in section 1.9. 
1.2 Rationale 
Information technology is important for the businesses of today because this is the 
information age, with information and its uses permeating modern life. Information 
technology is required to store, control and manipulate a company’s information, which 
has several benefits for the company concerned. However, if the information technology 
functions are not implemented properly this may impact negatively on the company 
concerned. Information technology enables communication and creates opportunities, 
especially for small businesses which are able to transact with larger organisations as a 
result of their ability to communicate electronically (Tapscott & Caston, 1993; Powell & 
Dent-Micallef, 1997). 
However, the networking which is required to facilitate communication demands 
substantial investment, for example, a wired local area network involves overheads 
which include the laying of cables to each device connected. However, in the case of 
wireless local area networks (WLANs) it is possible to add several additional devices and 
connect these devices easily without extra overheads being incurred (McCullough, 2001). 
In view of the importance of information and technology resources, it is of the utmost 
important that these resources are protected to prevent any loss of business. Companies 
may use international information security framework standards such as the Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5 for Information Security 
(ISACA, 2012), the International Organisation for Standardisation and the International 
Electro-Technical Commission (ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), Information Security Forum (ISF) 
Standard of Good Practice 2012 (Information Security Forum, 2012), Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) (Von Bon, 2007), and the National Institute of 
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Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-100 (NIST, 2006) to 
protect their information and technology resources. 
However, these standards may not necessarily be appropriate for small, medium and 
micro enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. There is little known about the way in which 
SMMEs protect their WLANs and, thus, a limited survey was conducted to establish 
whether SMMEs in South Africa currently use WLANs and how such networks are 
protected. The details of this survey are contained in Appendix A. 
It emerged from the survey that WLANs were used widely by SMMEs. However, there was 
a lack of WLAN security controls. This was perceived as a problem and resulted in this 
research endeavour. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Modern businesses are not able to compete in today’s competitive business environment 
unless they have access to information technology resources and, specifically, to 
networking resources (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). This is especially true for SMMEs 
because, in general, SMMEs do have no major information technology divisions in their 
companies to support high availability requirements. SMMEs often tend to use WLANs. 
However, this practice is accompanied by its own set of problems. It is essential that 
organisations protect themselves against the increasing threats that are exacerbated by 
Internet communications (Upfold & Sewry, 2005). 
As mentioned above a preliminary survey was conducted to explore the WLAN security 
landscape in which SMMEs in South Africa operate. It was found that the majority of 
SMMEs do not have sufficient WLAN security controls in place. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that SMMEs do not necessarily possess the 
resources or knowledge required to secure WLANs on their own and, for the majority of 
SMMEs, this task is considered to be both daunting and unachievable (Upfold & Sewry, 
2005). 
There does exist some guidance in the form of the international, information security, 
best practice control framework standards which were mentioned in the previous 
section. However, SMMEs do not necessarily have the financial resources available to 
purchase these standards while these standards are also not specific to WLANs and, more 
particularly, to the WLAN needs of SMMEs. Thus these standards are not necessarily 
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useful in the context of securing WLANs within SMMEs with SMMEs requiring guidance 
that is less complex and requires fewer resources to implement as compared to the 
standards mentioned above. 
Thus, the problem which this dissertation addresses may be stated as follows: 
There exists a lack of guidance regarding the securing of Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLANs) among small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The main research question is as follows: 
What components are necessary for the creation of a WLAN security control framework 
specific to the needs of SMMEs in South Africa? 
The sub-research questions are as follows: 
1. What are the needs of SMMEs with regard to WLAN security? 
2. Which security control framework standards govern WLANs? 
3. What components should form part of a WLAN Security Control Framework that 
will be specific to the needs of SMMEs in South Africa? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this dissertation was to develop a framework that SMMEs could 
use to implement WLAN security. This framework, termed the WLAN Security Control 
Framework, was based on applicable security standards and best practices. 
In order to achieve the primary research objective, it was necessary to realise the 
following sub-objectives: 
 Determine the needs of SMMEs with regard to WLAN security. 
 Investigate existing security control frameworks that govern WLANs. 
 Determine the components that should form part of a WLAN Security Control 
Framework to meet the needs of SMMEs in South Africa. 
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1.6 Research Process 
The research process is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The study adopted a Design 
Science methodology, using the inductive method to collect the information required to 
develop a framework. Qualitative data was collected by means of a literature review and 
observations. The framework was validated using a focus group. 
1.7 Scope and Delineation of the Study 
The study was limited to the security of WLANs in SMMEs in South Africa. The study 
focused on the design and development of a framework that SMMEs could use via a 
literature review and argumentation. The literature review focused on existing literature 
on SMMEs in South Africa, WLAN technologies and international security control 
framework standards. 
The WLAN security control framework that was developed was then validated by means 
of a review by a focus group of subject experts. However, the study did not include a real 
world implementation of the framework developed. 
1.8 Ethical Considerations 
No vulnerable groups, as defined by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University’s ethical 
guidelines, were involved in this research study and, thus, no further ethical 
consideration was required. 
1.9 Layout of Chapters 
 Chapter 1: Introduction ‒ This chapter provides the background to the study. 
 Chapter 2: Research Methodology ‒ This chapter explains the research process 
adopted in the study. 
 Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies ‒ This chapter discusses the various WLAN 
technologies available. 
 Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs ‒ This chapter classifies SMMEs and 
examines their WLAN infrastructure. 
 Chapter 5: Information Security Control Framework ‒ This chapter itemises 
those aspects of various information security control frameworks that are 
suitable for WLANs. 
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 Chapter 6: The WLAN Security Control Framework ‒ This chapter presents the 
WLAN Security Control Framework which was developed. 
 Chapter 7: The Validation of the WLAN Security Control Framework ‒ This 
chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
 Chapter 8: Conclusion ‒ This chapter provides a brief summary of all the 
chapters, demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the realisation of 
the research objectives.  
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2 Research Methodology 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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2.1 Introduction 
Section 2.2 presents an overview of the research methodology that was followed during 
the study. This overview encompasses the research philosophy, research approach, 
research strategy and choices, time horizons and the techniques and procedures used. 
The actual research process is described in section 2.3 and the chapter is concluded in 
section 2.4. 
2.2 Research Methodology 
The research onion as presented by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2007) is used in 
order to describe the research methodology adopted in the study. A summary of the 
methodology used for this purposes of this study is provided in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Research methodology illustrated using the research onion model (Saunders et al., 2007). 
2.2.1 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy depends on the way in which the researcher views the world 
surrounding the particular research area. According to Mouton (2001), one may view this 
world as the world of meta-science, in which case the philosophical paradigms may be 
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either positivism, realism, postmodernism, critical theory, phenomenology or else the 
design science paradigm which is popular in the engineering field. 
Research involves understanding a particular phenomenon ‒ in the case of this study the 
security controls that are required for wireless local area networks (WLANs) in small, 
medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. Phenomenology is used when 
the events and issues which are being investigated are external to the individual. Thus, 
phenomenology refers to how the researcher is able to make sense of the world around 
him/her and involves either detailed suggestions about individual situations or the 
description of experiences. Phenomenology lends itself to qualitative research (Babbie, 
2005; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Mason, 2002). 
When following the phenomenological approach, the researcher studies a particular 
situation by means of interviews, observations, conversations and other inductive 
methods including text analysis, thereby gaining various perceptions of the situation. 
There are no hypotheses with which to start and the final findings are produced without 
the researcher having had any preconceptions or ideas about the situation in question 
(Lester, 1999).  
There is a difference between natural science and design science (which is the more 
artificial of the two). As regards the particular phenomenon studied in this research study, 
it was possible to use design science to investigate the existing situation, namely, the 
securing of WLANs in SMMEs. Thus, tor the purpose of this research study design science 
was chosen as the overarching philosophical paradigm. Design science involves 
developing something, in this case a WLAN Security Control Framework (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2004).   
In design science research the researcher becomes aware of a problem and develops a 
solution to the problem which must then be validated. The design science researcher may 
be a pragmatist who attempts to manipulate and control the environment (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2004).   
The use of certain of design science guidelines, as proposed by Hevner, March, Park, and 
Ram (2004), made it possible to ensure that this research study had been conducted 
correctly ‒ See further explanations below (Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers, Tuunanen, 
Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007): 
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1. Design as an artefact ‒ The framework that was developed in this research study 
was a product in itself and, thus, it served as an artefact in terms of design science. 
2. Problem relevance ‒ The relevance of the research problem was argued in section 
1.3.  
3. Design evaluation ‒ The framework was developed by examining typical SMME 
WLAN infrastructures and identifying the WLAN security needs of the SMMEs, 
thereby evaluating their security level. The framework itself was presented after 
argumentation while the framework was validated using a focus group (see 
section 2.2.4). 
4. Research contribution ‒ It was anticipated that the framework developed would 
contribute to the securing of WLANs in SMMEs.   
5. Research rigour ‒ The study was conducted using the design science research 
methodology (Peffers et al., 2007), which includes defining objectives, creating an 
artefact, demonstrating the artefact’s use, evaluating the solution to the research 
problem and, finally, communicating the research outcomes to relevant audiences. 
6. Design as a search process ‒ The process of building the framework was iterative 
and was refined after several cycles. 
7. Communicate the research outcomes ‒ The framework was communicated to 
relevant audiences by means of this research document and also other research 
papers. 
2.2.2 Research Approach 
The research approach followed may use either inductive or deductive reasoning. 
Inductive reasoning involves observing data and producing concepts and patterns. Thus, 
this implies “theory building research”. On the other hand, deductive reasoning uses 
theory first and arrives at conclusions, thus implying “theory testing research” 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Mouton, 2001; Olivier, 2009). 
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This research study used inductive reasoning. Thus, the information required was 
collected and the framework developed on the basis of the information collected. Further 
induction was applied when the framework was validated. 
2.2.3 Research Strategy, Choice and Data Collection 
Research strategies may be categorised either as quantitative or qualitative research or 
a mixture of the two.   
Qualitative research was deemed appropriate to the purposes of this particular 
research topic because the sources of data were primarily textual, although the data could 
also be collected through observation and experience. It was essential that the researcher 
remained objective while conducting qualitative research study (Bhattacherjee, 2012; 
Myers, 1997; Olivier, 2009). 
The stages of the research study are depicted in Table 2.1 together with the data 
collection methods used in each stage. 
Table 2.1: Overview of research questions with their data collection strategies 
Research 
question 
Data 
collection 
techniques 
Source of data (qualitative) 
1. What are the needs of 
SMMEs with regard to 
WLAN security? 
Literature 
review, 
observation 
and experience 
Literature on SMMEs 
Literature on WLANs 
Literature on WLAN security 
Experience while assisting with 
SMME networks 
Perceptions of SMMEs with respect 
to WLANs 
2. Which security control 
framework standards 
govern WLANs? 
Literature 
review 
Literature on security control 
framework standards 
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3. What components should 
form part of a WLAN 
Security Control 
Framework that will be 
specific to the needs of 
SMMEs in South Africa? 
Literature 
review 
Components from all the above 
sources 
For the purposes of this study qualitative data only was required. The literature reviews 
were necessary for this research and qualitative content analyses were also conducted. 
In addition, the experiences and theoretical knowledge of the researcher were taken into 
account. The data collected enabled the researcher to build the framework. 
2.2.4 Methods for Validation 
As stated in section 2.2.1, this study utilised design science as its research philosophy. 
The validation of the artefact (WLAN Security Control Framework) is part of the design 
science process to help ensure the rigour of a research study. Such validation may be 
achieved qualitatively by means of either a focus group or an expert interview. Both 
methods are discussed in the following sub-sections in order to provide support for the 
validation method adopted in this research study. Firstly, the focus group is discussed 
and then expert interviews. 
2.2.4.1 Focus Groups 
A focus group is a method used in which qualitative data is collected by engaging a small 
number of people in an interactive manner and focusing on a particular issue or topic. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to focus groups (Carson, Gilmore, Perry, & 
Gronhaug, 2001; Krueger & Casey, 2000; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Wilkinson, 2004): 
The advantages of a focus group include the following: 
 The focus group provides a social environment in which the participants are 
encouraged to share their opinions without there being any pressure to reach a 
consensus. 
 Questions and issues may be identified which had not occurred to the 
researcher. 
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 The focus group is flexible, thus enabling the participants to explore issues as 
they arise. 
 It is an efficient and cost-effective method for obtaining data from multiple 
participants. 
The disadvantages of a focus group include the following: 
 It may prove difficult to assemble the participants. 
 It is essential that the facilitator is skilled in conducting such groups. 
 The focus group does not take place in a natural setting as the participants are 
aware they are being observed. 
 The results may be unbalanced as a result of group dynamics. 
 The information obtained may either be suppressed or biased as a result of a 
lack of confidentiality and anonymity. 
2.2.4.2 Expert Interviews 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2011), an expert interview is a specialised type of 
interview that focuses on a particular interviewee, namely, “the expert”. Expert 
individuals are persons who are regarded as prominent, influential and/or well informed 
in an organisation or community. Expert individuals are selected as participants based 
on their knowledge and skills in areas relevant to the research in question. Expert 
individuals may also be selected as a result of their distinct perspectives (Gillham, 2000). 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to expert interviews (Hochschild, 2009; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Tansey, 2007). 
The advantages of an expert interview include the following: 
 The interviewer may triangulate between the interviewees without revealing 
the names of previous subjects. 
 The interviewees are able to provide a general view of an organisation or its 
affiliates. 
 The interviewees are able to provide valuable information as a result of the 
positions they hold in an organisation, e.g. they may report on an organisation’s 
policies, past histories and future plans from a specific viewpoint. 
The disadvantages of an expert interview include the following: 
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 It may be difficult to gain access to the experts in view of their time constraints. 
 The interviewer may need to adapt the questions in such a manner as to enable 
the expert the freedom to use his/her knowledge and imagination. 
Based on the above discussion on focus groups and expert interviews, it is evident that 
both methods could have been used to validate the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
However, this research study used a focus group method because the researcher was of 
the opinion that the multidisciplinary nature of a focus group would satisfy the 
requirement for information security knowledge, networking knowledge, and general 
research experience. 
2.2.5 Time Horizons 
The time horizons layer of the research onion show either a concurrent or a longitudinal 
study, depending on when the information is gathered. In a longitudinal study some of 
the measurements depend on earlier measurements and, therefore, different data is 
collected at a later date. In this study, much of the information gathering was conducted 
concurrently.  
2.2.6 Techniques and Procedures 
The sources of information for this research study were tabled in Table 2.1. It has also 
already been stated that qualitative data was gathered from these sources. The main data 
collection techniques used in this study included literature studies during which content 
analysis was done. Rigorous research arguments were prepared in accordance with the 
guidelines proposed by Mason (2002) for evidential or interpretive arguments. The 
framework that was developed contained concepts, theories and expectations to support 
and inform SMMEs about securing their WLANs. The contents of the framework were the 
result of the data collection techniques which were used as well as the researcher’s 
knowledge, experiences and observation of SMMEs (Krippendorff, 2004). A focus group 
was used to validate the framework which had been developed.  
2.3 Research Process 
This study commenced with a research proposal which intended to show that there is a 
lack of WLAN security frameworks that are suitable for use by SMMEs in South Africa. 
Unfortunately the researcher was not able to find sufficient literature on the topic and 
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had to conduct a brief survey which involved 64 participants in order to demonstrate the 
need for such a framework.  
The researcher set out to answer the first sub-question which involved identifying the 
needs of SMMEs with regard to WLAN security. A literature study was conducted on the 
topic of WLANs and, in particular, on securing WLANs in terms of physical security, 
technical security and operational security. SMMEs were then classified and their 
dependence on network infrastructure and WLANs, in particular, was examined. 
The next sub-question necessitated a literature study on the security control framework 
standards that govern WLANs. The researcher identified three control frameworks that 
were then studied in detail, namely, Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technology 5 for Information Security (COBIT 5), the International Organisation for 
Standardization and the International Electro-technical Commission 27002:2005 (ISO 
27002), and the Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practice 2012 (ISF SoGP). 
It was found that these frameworks were not entirely suitable for SMMEs as they were 
aimed at the larger corporations. Thus, despite the fact that they incorporated certain 
network security controls, these were not specifically tailored to securing WLANs. 
The final sub-question involved determining the components that were suitable for a 
WLAN Security Control Framework that would be specific to SMME needs in South Africa. 
An iterative process was followed in order to develop the framework. The information 
technology and networking requirements of SMMEs were taken into account in order to 
identify appropriate controls from the three security control frameworks that were 
suitable for inclusion in the WLAN Security Control Framework. Certain controls were 
refined to render them more applicable to the WLANs of SMMEs while some new controls 
were also introduced.  
After a number of iterations the final framework, was presented to a focus group for 
validation. An instrument in the form of a questionnaire was administered to the focus 
group to assist in the validation. The focus group was successful and the framework was 
deemed valid for securing the WLANs of SMMEs. 
It was anticipated that the outcomes of the research study would also be presented by 
means of publications. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research methodology used in the study by means of the 
research onion as presented by Saunders et al (2007). The research philosophy used was 
that of design science in terms of which the researcher becomes aware of a problem and 
develops a solution to the problem. Design science is useful for phenomenological 
philosophy. The research approach involved the inductive approach to collecting the 
information required for developing a framework. The research strategy adopted 
resulted in qualitative data being collected by means of literature reviews, observations 
and experience. A focus group was used to validate the framework. 
The literature review in the next chapter focuses on the WLAN Infrastructure of SMMEs.  
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3 WLAN Technologies 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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3.1 Introduction 
Wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies have helped to simplify networking by 
enabling multiple end users to share resources simultaneously in either a home or a 
business without the need for physically connecting the devices concerned with wires. 
Section 3.2 of this chapter discusses information technology networks. This is followed 
by a discussion of WLAN technologies in section 3.3 and specific threats that companies 
may face when using WLANs in section 3.4. Section 3.5.explains the security required for 
WLANs while section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Information Technology Networks 
Every business is in possession of information that is of strategic importance. In addition, 
the majority of businesses are required to communicate with customers, suppliers and 
other businesses. Information technology (IT) and networks, in particular, are important 
business enablers. IT networks provides a facility for borderless communication, 
bringing businesses closer together by removing barriers related to distance (Tapscott & 
Caston, 1993). 
Remote programs, databases and other resources become accessible via the use of IT 
networking, with communication becoming faster than before and the competitive edge 
advancing. There are also numerous other advantages to IT networking, including 
reduced costs as a result of the sharing of resources and the use of networking instead of 
large mainframes. The ability to connect to other businesses enables flexibility and 
increases the availability of IT and business resources (Sanders, 2011). 
However, relying on networking technologies to meet the majority of business 
requirements necessitates due diligence in the purchasing, implementation and 
maintenance of the IT networks. 
There are many types of IT networks that businesses may use. Local area networks 
(LANs) usually comprise a group of computers which are connected together in the same 
building. On the other hand, the computers in wide area networks (WANs) may be further 
apart and connected by either telephone lines or radio waves because of the distances 
between the computers. There are other types of networks in between LANs and WANs, 
for example campus area networks (CANs) and metropolitan area networks (MANs) 
(Baumann, 2002). 
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All of these IT networks may be built using either wired or wireless technologies. This 
research study focuses on wireless local area networks (WLANs). The next section 
discusses WLAN technologies. 
3.3 WLAN Technologies 
In 1997 the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) developed a set of 
required standards for implementing WLAN communication between computers and 
pre-existing networks, including home and office networks, and the Internet. In the 
decade and a half since their release, WLANs have matured and grown immensely in 
terms of capability, changing the face of computing and communication in the world at 
large. However, WLANs have also become a long, confusing list of IEEE standards, bound 
to the past by the required backwards compatibility (Rackley, 2011). 
WLANs for the home and office networks came into being in 1999 with the release of 
WLAN access points that used technology based on the first two commercial WLAN 
standards, namely, 802.11a and 802.11b. Wired computer networking had already been 
standardised under the code IEEE 802 and, thus, WLAN, as a subset of computer 
networking, became IEEE 802.11 (Rackley, 2011).  
WLANs operate in two main frequency bands which are commonly referred to as 2.4GHz 
and 5GHz. The main difference between the 2.4GHz WLAN and the 5GHz WLAN 
frequencies is signal range as the 2.4GHz frequency is able to reach farther than the 5GHz 
frequency. However, there is one problem with the 2.4GHz signals as they operate at the 
same frequency as microwave ovens and, thus, switching on a microwave oven in order 
to cook food degrades a 2.4GHz signal significantly (Rackley, 2011). The following sub-
sections discuss the various WLAN technologies. 
3.3.1 802.11a 
The 802.11a standard, developed in 1999, uses the 5GHz frequency band and may 
operate at transfer speeds of up to 54Mbps. However, unless WLAN client devices have a 
line of sight to a WLAN 802.11a access point, the devices will not achieve such speeds. 
The 802.11a devices work efficiently at short distances from the WLAN access point but, 
at larger distances or in a large home or office, the devices may either lose signal or, even 
if the signal has reached the access point, the signal would be significantly diminished. 
Accordingly, as the range limitations of 802.11a became an issue for the widespread 
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adoption of WLAN devices, a second WLAN protocol was developed, namely, 802.11b 
(Lewis & Davis, 2004). 
3.3.2 802.11b 
The 802.11b standard, developed in 2000, uses the 2.4GHz frequency band and supports 
a maximum data transfer rate of 11Mbps. The slower speed of 802.11b was not a 
significant at the time of its development as a result of the state of the Internet as the 
fastest Internet connections were connecting between 4 to 6Mbps. The 802.11b worked 
better in the average home or office building than the 802.11a and, thus, became the 
standard used WLAN and the 2.4GHz frequency band was used effectively for nearly a 
decade (Lewis & Davis, 2004). 
3.3.3 802.11g 
In 2003, the 802.11g WLAN standard was ratified. Combining some of the algorithms 
used in 802.11a to achieve faster data speeds, but built upon the existing 2.4GHz 802.11b 
standard, the WLAN 802.11g was able to achieve the same 54Mbps speed as 802.11a, but 
travel the same distances as 802.11b (Eldad & Stacey, 2013). 
3.3.4 802.11n 
The 802.11n WLAN standard was made official in 2009. This standard allows for data 
transfer speeds of up to 300Mbps. With the introduction of this standard, WLANs could 
now be used to transfer larger files in a home or office network, without requiring the 
users to plug in via a network cable. The 802.11n WLAN standard may be used in both 
the 2.4GHz and the 5GHz frequency band (Eldad & Stacey, 2013) (IEEE 802.11n-2009). 
3.3.5 802.11ac 
The 802.11ac standard, ratified in 2012, was the latest WLAN standard at the time of this 
research study. It is the second revision of the WLAN 802.11a standard and supports 
transfer speeds of up to 1300Mbps. The 802.11ac WLAN standard uses the 5GHz 
frequency band (Eldad & Stacey, 2013). 
It is clear from the discussion above that WLAN technologies have improved significantly 
in recent years. However, as discussed in the next section, these WLANs are vulnerable 
to an increasing number of threats. 
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3.4 WLAN Threats 
The use of WLANs is accompanied by specific information security related 
responsibilities. This section will discuss the various threats that face WLANs. 
When employees discover that their organisation is not deploying WLANs, they 
sometimes take the matter into their own hands and install their own WLAN access 
points, thus creating significant breaches in the corporate network security 
infrastructure. Accordingly, security is an important topic that merits discussion when a 
WLAN is implemented (Cisco Systems, 2003). 
3.4.1 Malware Threats 
The threat of malware to a WLAN is caused by malicious software which has been 
developed for the purpose of compromising information and harming networks. Malware 
threats may be targeted against either an organisation or an individual. They typically 
include the following (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 Viruses/worms ‒ These are self-replicating programs that propagate between 
WLAN devices and perform one or more unauthorised actions such as corrupting 
information on the WLAN or transmitting an organisation’s information to 
unauthorised individuals. 
 Trojan horses ‒ These are malicious programs that masquerade as authorised 
programs and transmit an organisation’s information to unauthorised individuals. 
3.4.2 Hacking Threats 
Hacking threats to WLANs involve unauthorised external individuals deliberately 
attempting to access or harm an organisation’s network by exploiting vulnerabilities and 
bypassing security controls. Hacking threats are deliberate and malicious in nature. They 
typically include the following (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 Denial of service attacks ‒ This involve an external individual deliberately 
overloading systems and WLAN devices, often in order to degrade an 
organisation’s network operations. 
 Unauthorised use of access credentials, which involves an unauthorised user 
using valid credentials to gain access to a WLAN. These threats are often the result 
of identity theft. 
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 Unauthorised WLAN scanning, which involves an unauthorised individual 
probing and scanning WLAN devices to gather information that may be used to 
perform an attack. 
 Unauthorised tapping of WLAN traffic, which is often referred to as 
“eavesdropping” and involves the interception or modification of information as it 
is transmitted over WLANs. 
 Unauthorised decryption of sensitive information, which involves an 
unauthorised individual using techniques such as cracking passwords and brute 
force attacks to decrypt information over a WLAN. 
 Theft of authentication details, which involves an unauthorised individual 
gaining access to an organisation’s WLAN by using access control information such 
as passwords and encryption keys. 
3.4.3 Social Engineering Threats 
Social engineering threats involve the use of social tactics to exploit individuals and 
persuade them to perform specific actions such as disclosing WLAN authentication 
information. There are a variety of techniques that may be used including deception, 
manipulation and intimidation. Social engineering threats are deliberate and malicious in 
nature and involve activities such as blackmail, scams and threats. They typically include 
the following (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 Impersonation, which involves an unauthorised individual pretending to be 
another person in order to gain information on how to access an organisation’s 
WLAN. 
 Phishing, which is a method that uses communication channels such as emails and 
websites that appear to be legitimate in order to mislead recipients into divulging 
sensitive WLAN information. 
3.4.4 Misuse Threats 
Misuse involves the unauthorised use of resources and privileges to gain access to 
information on a WLAN. Misuse threats are deliberate and may be either malicious or 
non-malicious in nature. They typically include the following (Information Security 
Forum, 2012): 
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 Unauthorised modification of user access, which involves granting a user 
administrative access to a WLAN without approval or sign-off by management. 
This may, in turn, lead to administrative abuse. 
 Unauthorised system activity, which involves users using the WLAN to carry out 
unauthorised activities such as downloading movies and music. These activities 
place a strain on the WLAN network performance. 
3.4.5 Physical Threats 
Physical threats are typically associated with the loss or theft of WLAN equipment. 
Physical threats may be deliberate acts of theft, tampering or sabotage, or negligence on 
the part of an individual. They typically include the following (Information Security 
Forum, 2012): 
 Unauthorised physical access, which involves unauthorised individuals 
deliberately gaining access to the locations which house the WLAN equipment by 
either tailgating or pretending to be an authorised individual. 
 Theft or loss of WLAN equipment, which can happen either on an organisation’s 
premises or off-site. The WLAN equipment may include access points, laptops, cell 
phones and tablets. 
3.4.6 Error Threats 
Error threats to WLANs are usually the result of mistakes made by one or more 
individuals. Such mistakes may be the result of an unintentional action, such as the 
misconfiguration of a WLAN device or the malfunction of the hardware. Error threats are 
linked to weaknesses that involve either the human element or the hardware. They 
typically include the following (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 User errors, which are mistakes made by staff members using WLANs such as 
connecting to incorrect service set identifiers (SSIDs). 
 Technical errors, which are mistakes made by information technology (IT) 
administrators when configuring or deploying WLANs. 
 System overload, which is excessive WLAN activity, thus causing WLAN 
performance degradation or failure. 
 WLAN equipment malfunction, which refers to the failure of WLAN hardware. 
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3.4.7 Environmental Threats 
Environmental threats are typically associated with WLANs being affected by either 
natural events, such as floods or storms, or man-made events, such as fires, explosions, 
riots or electrical interference. Environmental threats may be either accidental or 
intentional. They typically include the following (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 Natural disasters, which include storms, fires and flooding and they all may have 
a negative effect on WLANs. 
 Accidental physical damage, which involves the unintentional material damage 
of WLAN equipment. Such material damage usually affects the functioning of 
WLAN equipment. 
 Malicious physical damage, which involves deliberate, material damage to 
WLAN equipment such as electrical interference or fire. Such material damage 
usually affects the functioning of WLAN equipment. 
 Power failure, which refers to the loss of power to WLAN equipment, thus 
resulting in a loss of functionality. 
 Malicious jamming of WLAN, which impedes wireless communications from 
reaching the intended recipients. 
It is necessary to counteract all the threats that have been mentioned above by 
implementing appropriate security controls. The next section discusses WLAN security. 
3.5 WLAN Security 
The importance of WLAN security is increasing every day. The news is filled with reports 
of data breaches with customer data being lost and companies being forced to manage 
the crises. The threats listed in the previous section may cause substantial financial losses 
to organisations. Thus, instead of waiting for security incidents to occur and then 
respond, it is essential that organisations proactively secure their WLANs (Wong & 
Yeung, 2009). 
The three main goals of WLAN security are to protect an organisation from the loss of 
confidentiality, the loss of integrity and the loss of availability. Most security practices 
and controls are based on protecting an organisation against losses in one or more of 
these areas. These areas are often referred to as the CIA triad and they comprise the core 
principles of information security (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005): 
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 Confidentiality ensures that WLAN data is not disclosed to unauthorised users. 
 Integrity ensures that WLAN data is both correct and current. 
 Availability ensures that WLAN devices and data are available when needed. 
Organisations should be aware that any flaws in the controls designed to mitigate the loss 
of CIA may be exploited for malicious purposes and, thus, when organisations secure their 
WLANs, it is essential that they consider three different types of security, namely, physical 
security, technical security and operational security (Wong & Yeung, 2009). 
3.5.1 Physical Security 
Physical security is a critical element of an overall security programme. Without physical 
security all the other security controls and safeguards may be rendered useless. The lack 
of physical boundaries in WLANs creates major security issues for organisations. It is not 
easy to control the signal range of the WLANs and, therefore, it is highly possible that the 
signal will extend past the boundaries created by the wired LANs. WLANs have the 
potential to provide access to any user within the coverage area, even if that user is not 
within the organisation’s physical security perimeter. Accordingly, when an organisation 
wishes to physically secure its WLAN, the organisation should consider the following 
(Bhargava & Sichitiu, 2005): 
 WLAN access point location and fixing – Organisations should make sure that 
the placement of the WLAN access points allow for the desired coverage while also 
ensuring that there is a minimal likelihood of displacement, tampering or 
unauthorised removal of such points. All the WLANs risk a collapse if too many 
access points are out of commission, including the most important areas where 
employees use the wireless for work purposes. 
 Tie downs, camouflage and restricted access ‒ All of the WLAN access points 
should be physically secured by measures such as tie-down straps and 
camouflaging the devices. Camouflaged and secreted devices have the advantage 
of being hidden from the general view. Devices that cannot be seen are less likely 
to be compromised. Accordingly, placing access points in suspended ceilings, 
wiring closets or fixtures such as ornaments or pot plants improves the security 
of the organisation. 
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 Network monitoring and site surveys ‒ Organisations should use tools to 
conduct surveys and conduct site monitoring to check for signal leakage and 
physical interference indicators. These tools may be used to test whether the 
wireless access covers all the areas that the organisation wishes to be covered 
while maintaining either zero leakage or as close to zero as possible. The use of 
bidirectional antennas may help to reduce the risk of a network being exposed to 
unauthorised individuals. Some organisations make use of signal jamming 
technologies to ensure that any leakage is rendered useless. This, in turn, helps to 
eliminate the risk of war driving which uses wireless scanning software with 
portable devices such as laptops and personal digital assistants (PDAs) to plot the 
wireless networks within a region. 
Various devices such as cell phones, laptops and PDAs may be wireless enabled. The 
securing of such devices will also form part of the physical layer of security. If such 
devices are left unattended this may result in their being stolen, thus giving an 
unauthorised individual access to the organisation’s entire network (Levy, Tran, Lydon, 
Pollock, Parry, & Weigand, 2008). 
3.5.2 Technical Security 
The technical security of WLANs is extremely important. An WLAN that has not been 
secured allows anyone within the wireless range access to an organisation’s file servers, 
databases, email servers, etc. Therefore, in order to secure a WLAN properly, it is 
imperative that the following technical controls are implemented (Levy et al., 2008): 
 Ethernet Multiple Access Control (MAC) address filtering ‒ Each network 
interface has a unique MAC address. Configuring the WLAN access point with a 
MAC address which only allows authorised network interfaces to access the 
WLAN. Thus, any intruders attempting to gain access from their own unauthorised 
devices will be blocked. 
 Service set identifiers (SSID) ‒ The SSID acts as an identifier for a particular 
WLAN. It has two modes of operation, namely, open and closed. If the mode of 
operation is open, then the SSID of the WLAN access point is broadcast to the 
world whereas, if the mode of operation is closed, the SSID is hidden from the 
world. The benefit of a closed SSID is that the access points do not respond to 
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messages unless the client has the correct SSID in the message header. It is, 
therefore, recommended that any organisation intending to increase its security 
should set the SSID to closed mode as well as effect a change from the default SSID. 
 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA2) ‒ The use of the WPA2 wireless security 
standard means that an organisation experiences improved security connections 
as a result of the use of strong encryption methods. WPA2 has proved to be a 
secure standard when used with strong passwords in Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) or 
with an external authentication server using Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP). 
 Use 802.1x to authenticate all Devices ‒ A rogue access point is a WLAN access 
point that has been created to allow a hacker to conduct man-in-the-middle 
attacks. The best method for dealing with the threat of rogue access points is to 
use 802.1x as this prevents all unauthorised devices from connecting to the 
network by using strong authentication methods when a device attempts to 
connect to a network. 
 Use of Encryption ‒ Encrypting all traffic over a wireless network is one of the 
most effective ways in which to secure a WLAN. Thus, organisations should ensure 
that the WLAN access point that they purchase has a built-in encryption 
mechanism. 
 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) – Many organisations already have a VPN for 
accessing internal resources over the Internet. This same VPN may be used to give 
authorised users access to applications over the hostile wireless network. This, in 
turn, solves both the authentication and confidentiality issues of WLANs. 
 Enable logging ‒ Organisations should enable event monitoring and logging on 
all the devices in the network. These logs indicate to supply network 
administrators that unauthorised security-related activities have either been 
attempted or performed on the network. When properly designed and 
implemented, event logging and monitoring may assist organisations to determine 
what has been recorded on their systems so that there may be a follow-up 
investigation conducted, with remediation where necessary. 
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3.5.3 Operational Security 
Physical security and technical security provide a foundation only for defining what 
organisations should be using in order to secure their WLANs but they do not provide a 
method for governing these WLAN security systems. In order to do that an organisation 
must draw up WLAN security policies. A WLAN security policy is a set of rules that help 
to govern the behaviour of employees as well as the constraints applied to and enforced 
by the system so as to guarantee a predefined level of security. Everything in the WLAN 
should be accounted for in the WLAN security policy or else there will be no WLAN 
security (Wong & Yeung, 2009). 
It is essential that the policy cover all the obvious security threats as well as the more 
subtle threats. Even if the organisation’s network has the highest security protection from 
the outside world (i.e. Internet) but it is wide open to someone tampering with it if he/she 
is physically on site, then this is probably in violation of the intended security policy 
(Information Security Forum, 2012). 
The WLAN security policy should include which users may access what and which users 
may be given security services such as anti-virus, anti-spam, data backups and intrusion 
prevention. The policy should also take into account the location and security of the 
organisation’s endpoints and where employees are allowed to access the WLAN 
(Information Security Forum, 2012). 
In addition, the WLAN security policy should include processes that enable the 
organisation to handle unexpected events, including procedures for data protection and 
disaster recovery as well as user account lifespans and termination protocols 
(Information Security Forum, 2012). 
Finally, a WLAN security policy must include a process to ensure all systems are current 
and ready to carry out the core elements of the policy. This includes version updates for 
clients, servers and network devices and training users and staff on how to use the 
equipment in a safe and secure way (Baumann, 2002).  
Formulating a WLAN security policy is an intricate process. It would, therefore, be highly 
beneficial to an organisation to hire an expert security consultant to go over the WLAN 
security policy. The best way of uncovering loopholes in a WLAN security policy is to have 
as many people as possible go over it (Levy, et al., 2008). 
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Once an organisation has formulated the WLAN security policies the organisation must 
devise the procedures for the way in which the policies will be carried out. Such 
procedures are the operational processes which are required in order to implement the 
policies (Levy, et al., 2008). 
The procedures may include the following: 
 The steps taken to configure the WLAN security on the devices. 
 How users access the WLANs, including the applications to use. 
An effective security education, training and awareness programme will explain the 
actual rules and expected behaviour to the employees in an organisation. It is essential 
that such programmes communicate the policies and procedures that need to be followed 
so that employees may be held accountable if they are negligent (Wilson & Hash, n.d.). 
 Awareness programmes are designed to change behaviour and to reinforce sound 
security practices. The purpose of such awareness programmes is to focus 
employees’ attention on security. 
 Training strives to produce the relevant and necessary security skills and 
competencies. It teaches employees how to perform specific functions. 
 Education integrates all of the security skills and competencies that organisations 
require in order need to produce WLAN security specialists and professionals who 
are capable of both vision and proactive response.  
Once the security policies and procedures have been implemented, it is essential that 
processes are put in place in order to monitor compliance and effectiveness. 
Organisations should, thus, design automated tracking systems to capture key 
information regarding WLAN activity (e.g. user logons, services accessed, and usage 
statistics). This data should be captured in such a way so that it provides the organisation 
with an analysis of its awareness, training and education programmes (ISO/IEC 27002, 
2005). 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter commenced with a brief discussion of IT networks. This was followed by a 
detailed discussion on WLAN technologies as well as the typical threats facing WLANs as 
a result of the fact that WLANs have different requirements for security as compared to 
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wired networks. The security controls which may be implemented to mitigate these 
threats were discussed in terms of physical, technical and operational security. 
The cost of installing and maintaining a WLAN is, on average, lower than the cost of 
installing and maintaining a traditional wired LAN. The reason for this is that WLANs 
eliminate the direct costs of the cabling and labour associated with installation and repair. 
In addition, it is relatively simple both to move and to change WLANs and this, in turn, 
reduces the ongoing administrative costs.  
Thus, WLANs open up networking possibilities for companies that are not able to afford 
expensive wired networking infrastructures. In view of the fact that WLANs play such a 
significant role in business, this research study will investigate WLANs in small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMMEs). 
The next chapter discusses the WLAN technologies which are suited to SMMEs.  
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4 WLAN Technologies in SMMEs 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
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Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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4.1 Introduction 
It is estimated that small, medium and micro size enterprises (SMMEs) make up 91% of 
businesses in South Africa, while they account for between 52 and 57% of South Africa’s 
gross domestic product (Abor & Quartey, 2010). Thus, SMMEs comprise a substantial 
portion of South Africa’s economy and should therefore be protected appropriately to 
ensure their sustainability. 
Section 4.2 of this chapter contains a classification of SMMEs. This is followed by a 
discussion on the way in which information technology (IT) and network infrastructures 
are enablers for SMMEs and a brief explanation of the wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) used by SMMEs. 
4.2 Classifying SMMEs 
Countries tend to classify businesses differently according to size. This section discusses 
the classifications used in three different regions, namely, the United States, European 
Union and South Africa as well the way in which researchers classify businesses in their 
research documents. 
The United States (US) Small Business Act of 1953 defines a small business as “one that 
is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field of operation”. In the 
US, the term small and medium business (SMB) is often used. The SMBs differ according 
to the industry in question. However, in the main, the United States identifies a small 
business as a business which employs fewer than 100 employees while a medium sized 
business refers to a business which employs between 100 and 500 employees (Small 
Business Administration, 2011). 
The European Union (EU) uses the abbreviation SME to describe the small to medium 
enterprises. The current definition used in the EU categorises companies which employ 
fewer than 10 employees as micro enterprises, companies which employ between 10 and 
50 employees as small enterprises and companies which employ between 50 and 250 
members as medium enterprises. In addition, these companies may not have an annual 
turnover exceeding 50 million euros and/or an annual balance sheet total exceeding 43 
million euros (European Commission, 2003). 
The majority of researchers classify businesses according to their number of full-time 
employees or to their annual turnover. For example, Tapia, Correa and Manzanares 
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(2009), define a medium enterprise as employing between 50 and 250 employees, a small 
enterprise as employing between 10 and 50 employees and a micro enterprise as 
employing fewer than 10 employees. However, some researchers define a business 
according to the way in which it is controlled and owned. Fuller (2003) maintains “a small 
business means one that is owned by the people running it and which is relatively 
powerless with respect to national or global market”. 
The South African National Small Business Act, 1996 (South Africa, 1996) defines a small 
business as “a separate and distinct entity, including co-operative enterprises and non-
governmental organisations, managed by one owner or more which, including its 
branches or subsidiaries, if any, is predominantly carried on in a sector or subsector of 
the economy mentioned in column 1 of the Schedule and which can be classified as a 
micro-, a very small, a small or a medium enterprise by satisfying the criteria mentioned 
in columns 3, 4 and 5 of the Schedule opposite the smallest relevant size or class as 
mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule”. The schedule referred to in this definition has 
since been updated (Table 4.1) in the National Small Business Amendment Act of 2003. 
Table 4.1: Extract of Schedule of the National Small Business Amendment Act of 2003 (Redrawn from 
Schedule of the National Small Business Amendment Act of 2003 by South Africa, 2003, Retrieved June 6, 
2011 from http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1996/a102-96.pdf) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
Sector or 
subsector in 
accordance 
with the 
Standard 
Industrial 
Classification 
Size of class The total full-
time 
equivalent of 
paid 
employees 
Total 
turnover 
Total gross 
asset value 
(fixed 
property 
excluded) 
Agriculture Medium 100 R5 m R5 m 
 Small 50 R3 m R3 m 
 Very Small 10 R0.50 m R0.50 m 
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 Micro 5 R0.20 m R0.20 m 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
Medium 200 R39 m R23 m 
 Small 50 R10 m R6 m 
 Very Small 20 R4 m R2 m 
 Micro 5 R0.20 m R0.10 m 
As shown in Table 4.1, the classification of the size of a business depends on several 
factors. These factors include the sector or subsector in accordance with the Standard 
Industrial Classification, the total full-time equivalent of paid employees, the total 
turnover and the total gross asset value of the business (South Africa, 2003). In South 
Africa such businesses are referred to as SMMEs. 
It is clear from the discussion above there are many different classifications for SMMEs. 
This research study uses a generic classification method as depicted in Table 4.2. As may 
be seen in the table, micro-sized enterprises employ between one and five employees, 
small-sized enterprises between six and 50 employees and medium-sized enterprises 
between 51 and 200 employees. Enterprises with more than 200 employees are 
regarded as large enterprises and are not be included in the scope of this study. 
Table 4.2: Enterprise classifications used for the purposes of this study. 
Size of class The total full-time employees 
Micro enterprises 1–5 employees 
Small enterprises 6–50 
Medium enterprises 51–200 
Large enterprises More than 200 
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4.3 IT as an Enabler in SMMEs 
Information technology has enabled SMMEs to connect with other parties throughout the 
world using powerful tools such as email or the Internet, thus making it possible for them 
to reach broader markets than would otherwise be the case. Communication tools such 
as cell phones or smartphones have resulted in numerous improvements for both the 
employees and the customers of SMMEs. Text messaging and social networks have also 
facilitated communication. In addition, SMMEs are able to market and advertise in order 
to reach new customers using search engines and online advertising. Productivity has 
improved because it is possible to complete tasks more quickly by using technology. The 
SMMEs and their customers have been brought closer together with this resulting in 
improved customer service. SMMEs are now able to provide telecommuting and flexi time 
benefits by using email, online collaboration tools and mobile computing while SMMEs 
are also able to extend their reach by using teleconferencing to include global customers 
and employees (Mitra, 2005). 
Thus, IT has become a key tool which management is able to use in order to ensure 
operational benefits and to grow the business. All the strategic initiatives behind a 
transaction are heavily reliant on IT and, thus, it is no longer possible for businesses 
either to ignore IT or to view it merely as a back-office function if they want to achieve 
growth. Like the larger corporations, SMMEs also make use of IT and networking, in 
particular, to perform the everyday business functions. The next section discusses the 
appropriate networking infrastructure for SMMEs (Overby, Bharadwaj, & Sambamurthy, 
2006). 
4.4 SMME Networking Infrastructure 
Networking infrastructures facilitate the IT communication required for business. A 
network infrastructure is an interconnected group of computer systems which are linked 
by various components of the telecommunications architecture. These networks may 
operate over wired or wireless local area network (WLAN) connections or a combination 
of both (Sanders, 2011). 
The network infrastructure includes both the physical hardware used to transmit data 
electronically, for example, routers, switches, gateways, bridges, cables, WLAN access 
points and backbones and also the software, for example, network protocols, security 
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controls and network access methodologies. The network infrastructures may be either 
open or closed, for example, the open architecture of the Internet or the closed 
architecture of a private local area network (LAN). 
The majority of SMMEs use the simplest form of a network infrastructure. This typically 
consists of one or more computers, a network or Internet connection, and a device linking 
all the computers and systems to each another. These networks communicate with 
outside networks (e.g. Internet) by means of a router which bridges the networks and 
provides a common language for data exchange according to the rules of each network 
(Wong & Yeung, 2009). 
When multiple computers in an SMME share an Internet connection this is considered a 
network infrastructure. The Internet itself is an advanced network infrastructure which 
serves millions of businesses, allowing them to access the global network which stores 
information on various systems. SMME intranets are similar to the global Internet but 
they operate in a closed network infrastructure which is accessible only to those within 
it. SMME intranets generally include the central data storage where one or more servers 
are located and employees are able to access the information on these servers from their 
individual workstations (Wong & Yeung, 2009). 
4.5 WLANs in SMMEs 
In the past WLANs were regarded as a slow and unreliable network standard (Chen, 
Katsaros, Nanopoulos, & Manolopoulos, 2005). The 802.11g standard, which was ratified 
in 2003, is now regarded as inadequate because applications have become more complex 
and require more bandwidth than before. The 802.11g standard struggled to stream 
video data efficiently because of the speeds that it offered. 
The new 802.11ac standard, which was ratified in 2012, uses newer technologies and has 
tweaked the existing technologies to give WLANs more speed and range than was 
previously the case. The speed which is obtainable when using 802.11ac is up to 
1300Mbps, thus making WLANs a sustainable choice for SMMEs. The various WLAN 
technologies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 (Eldad & Stacey, 2013).  
The benefits of using WLANs in SMMEs include the following (Chandra et al., 2009): 
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 Mobility ‒ WLAN users have the ability to access shared resources without 
needing a place anywhere in the organisation to plug into. A WLAN allows users 
to be truly mobile as long as the WLAN device is within the network coverage area. 
 Range of coverage ‒ The range of a typical WLAN access point is approximately 
100 metres. WLAN access points may extend the cover of an area in such a way 
that the range of coverage of the access points overlap, thus providing roaming. 
This, in turn, enables the WLAN user to wander around and move from the 
coverage area of one access point to another while maintaining seamless 
connection within the network. 
 Ease of use ‒ WLANs are easy to use and the users require minimum experience 
only to take advantage of WLANs. 
 Flexibility ‒ The installation of a WLAN infrastructure can be fast and easy and 
may eliminate the need to pull cable through walls and ceilings. Thus, WLANs may 
be set up where it is impossible to install wires. 
 Scalability ‒ WLANs can be designed to be either extremely simple or extremely 
complex. They are able to support large numbers of WLAN devices and cover large 
physical areas by adding access points in order to extend coverage. 
 Cost ‒ The cost of installing and maintaining a WLAN is, on average, lower than the 
cost of installing and maintaining a traditional wired LAN. The reason for this is 
that WLANs eliminate the direct costs of the cabling and labour associated with 
installation and repair. In addition, it is relatively easy to move and change WLANs 
and this, in turn, reduces the ongoing administrative costs. 
WLANs enable users to access the peripherals within wireless reach such as servers, 
printers and other network resources, regardless of their location. Thus, this means that 
the user has the ability to stay connected while working anywhere in the company ‒ from 
the meeting room to the cafeteria. SMMEs have recognised the benefits of such flexibility 
and have deployed WLANs in high numbers. According to the 2003 Wireless LAN Benefits 
Study (Cisco Systems, 2003), WLAN users stay connected to a corporate network for 3.5 
hours per day longer than their wired peers, thus making employees 27 percent more 
productive than they would otherwise have been. 
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When comparing the benefits of WLANs for an SMME against the total cost of ownership 
(TCO), it becomes clear that the use of WLANs may bring more value to a business, 
provided that the WLAN is secured and managed properly (Cisco Systems, 2003). 
The securing and management of WLANs are, thus, extremely important and require 
considerable, attention especially in view of the fact that WLANs tend to be exposed to 
more threats than wired networks.  
SMMEs, in particular, do not usually have on-site security support personnel and may not 
have funds required to outsource the WLAN security functions. This, in turn, often implies 
a lack of the required knowledge, skills and resources as regards securing WLANs on the 
part of SMMEs. 
It would, therefore be extremely useful for SMMEs to have access to guidelines derived 
from accepted international information security control frameworks and standards and 
to use these in their own in-house implementation and securing of their WLANs. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed WLANs in the context of SMMEs and their needs. The chapter 
started by classifying SMMEs and proceeded to discuss the benefits of WLANs for SMMEs. 
The same WLAN security threats which were discussed in Chapter 3 as affecting larger 
organisations also affect SMMEs. It was also stated in Chapter 4 that WLANs are more 
suited to SMMEs as compared to wired networks. However, it was also seen that, in 
general, SMMEs do not have at their disposal the resources, knowledge, and skills 
required to secure WLANs effectively and, thus, WLANs often present more risks in 
SMME’s than in larger organisations. 
There is a definite need for SMMEs to have in place effective WLAN security controls. 
Accordingly, the next chapter will examine information security control frameworks in 
order to ascertain whether they meet the needs involved in securing WLANs in SMMEs.  
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5 Information Security Control Frameworks 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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5.1 Introduction 
If an implementation is to be conducted in the correct manner and ensure effectiveness, 
it is useful to have a benchmark that has been developed using international best 
practices. With regard to information security there are several security control 
framework standards which are recognised internationally as useful guidelines for the 
effective implementation of information security in organisations. The use of a 
recognised information security framework makes it is possible to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of all the information technology (IT) assets in 
an organisation. 
This chapter will discuss various information security (IS) control framework standards, 
detailing how they are used and for what. Section 5.2 discusses various control 
frameworks and section 5.3 explains why the frameworks are aimed at the larger 
organisations. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 IS Control Frameworks 
A control framework is a “structured way of categorising controls to ensure the whole 
spectrum of a control is covered adequately” (ISACA, 2012). A number of information 
security control frameworks have been developed to assist organisations in the securing 
their information assets. These frameworks include Control Objectives for Information 
and Related Technology (COBIT) 5 for Information Security (ISACA, 2012), International 
Organisation for Standardisation and the International Electro-Technical Commission 
(ISO/IEC) 27002:2005 (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005), Information Security Forum (ISF) 
Standard of Good Practice 2012 (Information Security Forum, 2012), Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) (Von Bon, 2007) and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-100 (NIST, 2006). 
The information security control frameworks listed above all have implications for the 
objectives of this research study. However, in view of the magnitude of any research 
endeavour involved in analysing each framework three only were selected for the 
purposes of the this study. The control frameworks selected were COBIT 5 for 
Information Security, ISO/IEC 27002 and ISF Standard of Good Practice. The COBIT 5 
framework was selected because it is the only framework for the governance and 
management of business and IT, while the ISO/IEC 27002 was selected because it 
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provides detailed guidelines for information security practices and is widely used 
amongst organisations. The ISF Standard of Good Practice was selected because the body 
that created it is regarded as the world’s leading authority on information security and 
the ISF group is made up of thousands of information security specialists worldwide.  
These frameworks, which were used in this research study, are discussed in the sub-
sections below. 
5.2.1 COBIT 5 for Information Security 
COBIT is a framework which was created by the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA) for information technology management and IT governance (ISACA, 
2012). It is a supporting toolset that enables managers to bridge the gap between control 
requirements, technical issues and business risks. ISACA first released COBIT in 1996. 
However, the version discussed in this research study, COBIT 5, was released in 2012. 
COBIT 5 for Information Security builds on the COBIT 5 framework in that it provides a 
more detailed and practical approach to information security than the COBIT 5 
framework. COBIT 5 for Information Security is intended for all stakeholders in the 
information security within an organisation, including chief information security officers, 
information security managers, and other information security professionals. 
COBIT 5 for Information Security comprises a total of thirty-seven processes. As listed in 
Table 5.1 these thirty-seven processes are grouped into the five domains (ISACA, 2012): 
Table 5.1: COBIT 5 for information security domains and processes 
COBIT 5 DOMAINS COBIT 5 PROCESSES 
Evaluate, Direct and 
Monitor (EDM) 
EDM addresses a set of interactions between governance 
and management and is intended to result in an efficient 
and effective governance system. The processes in this 
domain include the following: 
EDM01: Ensure Governance Framework Setting and 
Maintenance 
EDM02: Ensure Benefits Delivery 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS COBIT 5 PROCESSES 
EDM03: Ensure Risk Optimisation 
EDM04: Ensure Resource Optimisation 
EDM05: Ensure Stakeholder Transparency 
Align, Plan and Organise 
(APO) 
APO addresses the strategies and tactics to be adopted 
and how to identify the best way in which IT may 
contribute to realising the business objectives of an 
organisation. The processes in this domain include the 
following: 
APO01: Manage the IT Management Framework 
APO02: Manage Strategy 
APO03: Manage Enterprise Architecture 
APO04: Manage Innovation 
APO05: Manage Portfolio 
APO06: Manage Budget and Costs 
APO07: Manage Human Resources  
APO08: Manage Relationships 
APO09: Manage Service Agreements 
APO10: Manage Suppliers 
APO11: Manage Quality 
APO12: Manage Risk 
APO13: Manage Security 
Build, Acquire and 
Implement (BAI) 
The realisation of the IT strategy requires the 
identification, development and acquisition of IT 
solutions as well as the implementation of these solutions 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS COBIT 5 PROCESSES 
and their integration with the business process. The 
processes in the BAI domain include the following: 
BAI01: Manage Programmes and Projects 
BAI02: Manage Requirements Definition 
BAI03: Manage Solutions Identification and Build 
BAI04: Manage Availability and Capacity 
BAI05: Manage Organisational Change Enablement 
BAI06: Manage Changes 
BAI07: Manage Change Acceptance and Transitioning 
BAI08: Manage Knowledge 
BAI09: Manage Assets 
BAI10: Manage Configurations 
Deliver, Service and 
Support (DSS) 
DSS addresses the delivery of the required services, 
ranging from traditional operations in respect of security 
and continuity to training. Included in this domain is the 
processing of data by application systems which fall 
under application controls. The processes in this domain 
include the following: 
DSS01: Manage Operations 
DSS02: Manage Service Requests and Incidents 
DSS03: Manage Problems 
DSS04: Manage Continuity 
DSS05: Manage Security Services 
DSS06: Manage Business Process Controls 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS COBIT 5 PROCESSES 
Monitor, Evaluate and 
Assess (MEA) 
MEA addresses the regular assessment of IT processes 
over time as regards quality and compliance with control 
requirements. It also addresses performance 
management, monitoring of internal control, regulatory 
compliance and governance. The processes in this 
domain include the following: 
MEA01: Monitor, Evaluate and Assess Performance and 
Conformance 
MEA02: Monitor, Evaluate and Assess the System of 
Internal Control 
MEA03: Monitor, Evaluate and Assess Compliance with 
External Requirements 
COBIT 5 for Information Security integrates both the business and the IT functional 
responsibilities and provides a clear distinction between the roles and practices of 
information security governance and information security management. In addition, it 
outlines responsibilities at various levels of the enterprise, encompassing all process 
steps from the beginning to the end (ISACA, 2012). 
5.2.2 ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (hereafter “ISO 27002”) is an information security standard 
published by the ISO and by the IEC, and entitled Information Technology ‒ Security 
techniques ‒ Code of practice for information security management (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). 
ISO 27002 contains best practice recommendations on information security management 
for use by those responsible for implementing information security within an 
organisation. ISO 27002 best practices are intended for the stakeholders in the 
information security within an organisation, including the chief information security 
officer, information security manager and security engineers. 
The ISO 27002 comprises a total of eleven security control clauses (see Table 5.2): 
Table 5.2: ISO 27002 Control Clauses and Description 
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ISO 27002 CONTROL 
CLAUSES 
DESCRIPTION 
A.5: Security Policy A.5 provides management direction and support for 
information security in accordance with business 
requirements and relevant laws and regulations. 
A.6: Organisation 
Information Security 
A.6 ensures that a management framework is established 
to initiate and control the implementation of information 
security within the organisation and maintain the 
security of the organisation’s information and 
information processing facilities that are accessed, 
processed, communicated to, or managed by external 
parties. 
A.7: Asset Management A.7 ensures that all assets are accounted for and have a 
nominated owner. It also ensures that information is 
classified to indicate the need, priorities, and expected 
degree of protection when handling such information. 
A.8: Human Resources 
Security 
A.8 ensures that employees, contractors and third party 
users understand their responsibilities, are equipped to 
support the organisational security policies, and exit an 
organisation or change employment in an orderly 
manner. 
A.9: Physical and 
Environmental Security 
A.9 ensures the prevention of unauthorised physical 
access, damage, and interference to the organisation’s 
premises and information. 
A.10: Communications and 
Operations Management 
A.10 ensures the correct and secure operation of 
information processing facilities, the appropriate level of 
information security and service delivery in line with 
third party service delivery agreements, the minimised 
risk of system failures, the integrity of software and 
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ISO 27002 CONTROL 
CLAUSES 
DESCRIPTION 
information, the protection of information in networks, 
and the security of electronic commerce services. 
A.11: Access Control A.11 ensures that access to information is controlled and 
unauthorised access is prohibited. 
A.12: Information Systems 
Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance 
A.12 ensures that security is an integral aspect of the 
information systems and prevents errors, loss, 
unauthorised modification or misuse of information in 
applications. 
A.13: Information Security 
Incident Management 
A.13 ensures that the information security events and 
weaknesses associated with information systems are 
communicated in a manner which allows timely 
corrective action to be taken. 
A.14: Business Continuity 
Management 
A.14 ensures that interruptions to business activities are 
counteracted and protects critical business processes 
from the effects of major failures of information systems 
or disasters. 
A.15: Compliance A.15 ensures all breaches of any law, statutory, regulatory 
or contractual obligations are avoided and that security 
audits maximise effectiveness and minimise 
interferences. 
ISO 27002 is important because it provides organisations with an international 
framework on which auditors rely for verification of the compliance with security 
mandates. The implementation of ISO 27002 entails understanding and using its key 
concepts, principles and controls. The ISO 27002 begins with the 11 sections of best 
practices outlined above and which address an organisation's requirements as exposed 
by a formal risk assessment. Each section presents information in terms of four 
categories: Objective (or objectives), Control (or controls) that helps to meet the 
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objective, Implementation Guidance, and Other Information. According to ISO/IEC, the 
standard "is intended as a common basis and practical guideline for developing 
organisational security standards and effective security management practices, and to 
help build confidence in inter-organisational activities." (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). 
5.2.3 ISF Standard of Good Practice 
The Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) for Information Security, published by the ISF, is a 
business-focused, practical and comprehensive guide to identifying and managing the 
information security risks within an organisation (Information Security Forum, 2012).  
The ISF SoGP is aligned with the information security requirements as set out in the 
ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards, and provides a wider and deeper coverage of both the 
ISO/IEC 27002 control topics, as well as wireless local area network (WLAN) security. 
The ISF SoGP is used by information security managers, business managers, IT managers, 
auditors, and IT service providers in organisations of all sizes. 
The ISF SoGP comprises twenty-six security areas which are divided into the following 
four security categories (Information Security Forum, 2012): 
 Security Governance (SG) 
 Security Requirements (SR) 
 Control Framework (CF) 
 Security Monitoring and Improvement (SI) 
Table 5.3 lists the four security ISF SoGP security categories together with the twenty-six 
security areas. 
Table 5.3: ISF Standard of Good Practice 2012 Security Categories and Security Areas 
ISF SECURITY CATEGORIES ISF SECURITY AREAS 
SG: Security Governance The Security Governance category discusses how to 
develop an information security strategy within the 
organisation’s governance framework and how to 
drive such strategy through an information security 
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ISF SECURITY CATEGORIES ISF SECURITY AREAS 
programme. The security areas in this category 
include the following: 
SG1: Security Governance Approach 
SG2: Security Governance Components 
SR: Security Requirements The Security Requirements category discusses the 
functional and non-functional requirements that need 
to be satisfied in order to achieve the security 
attributes of an organisation. This category includes 
the following:  
SR1: Information Risk Assessment 
SR2: Compliance 
CF: Control Framework The Control Framework category discusses the 
various security controls that should be implemented. 
The controls are organised and categorised into 
different areas and includes security best practices 
and procedures. This category includes the following: 
CF1: Security Policy and Organisation 
CF2: Human Resource Security 
CF3: Asset Management 
CF4: Business Applications 
CF5: Customer Access 
CF6: Access Management 
CF7: System Management 
CF8: Technical Security Infrastructure 
CF9: Network Management 
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ISF SECURITY CATEGORIES ISF SECURITY AREAS 
CF10: Threat and Vulnerability Management 
CF11: Incident Management 
CF12: Local Environments 
CF13: Desktop Applications 
CF14: Mobile Computing 
CF15: Electronic Communications 
CF16: External Supplier Management 
CF17: System Development Management 
CF18: System Development Lifecycle 
CF19: Physical and Environment Security 
CF20: Business Continuity 
SI: Security Monitoring and 
Improvement 
The Security Monitoring and Improvement category 
discusses the monitoring processes and procedures in 
an organisation’s security environment as well as the 
improvement of an organisation’s security posture 
over time. The category includes the following: 
SI1: Security Audit 
SI2: Security Performance 
When the ISF SoGP is implemented comprehensively, organisations are able to build an 
Information Security Management System (ISMS), perform information risk assessments, 
and implement security controls beyond those defined in ISO 27002, and include topics 
not addressed by ISO 27002, such as cloud computing, cybercrime attacks and consumer 
devices (Information Security Forum, 2012). 
5.3 IS Control Frameworks and Larger Organisations 
It is clear from the above discussion on these information security control framework 
standards that they are aimed at larger organisations. For example, COBIT 5 BAI05 
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requires the presence of a qualified information security professional to serve on all the 
IT implementation teams. ISO 27002 A.6 Organisation Information Security states that 
information security activities should be co-ordinated by representatives with relevant 
expert roles and job functions. ISO 27002 A.15 Compliance indicates that a specific data 
protection officer should provide guidance to managers on the responsibilities and 
specific procedures that should be followed. ISF SoGP SG1.1 requires that a full time chief 
information security officer be appointed in the organisation, while ISF SoGP SR2.1 
requires the establishment of a high-level working group to manage information privacy 
issues. 
While such specialised information security personnel may be found in larger 
organisations, small organisations would not, typically, have an employee dedicated to 
these tasks. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The information security control frameworks researched in this study were not created 
specifically for small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs). The frameworks are 
exhaustive and, therefore, they are not suitable for SMMEs. In addition, they are aimed at 
larger corporations and are also not freely available, thus extensive resources are 
required in order to purchase them. The controls in the frameworks are typically aimed 
at experienced security professionals such as information security officers. They are also 
too complex for the ordinary SMME staff to understand and implement. Finally, the 
control frameworks are not specifically related to securing WLANs although there may 
be a few controls that may be applicable. 
This chapter has presented and examined various control frameworks that are used for 
information security. The next chapter highlights certain aspects of these frameworks in 
view of their relevance to the securing of WLAN implementations and they are used in 
the development of the WLAN Security Control Framework which is also presented in the 
next chapter. 
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6 WLAN Security Control Framework 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the proposed Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Security 
Control Framework. The WLAN Security Control Framework is a framework that small, 
medium and micro sized enterprises (SMMEs) may use to improve their WLAN security 
status. 
The framework helps SMMEs to secure their WLANs against the escalating threats of 
malware, hacking, social engineering, misuse, physical threats, error threats and 
environmental threats. 
Section 6.2 contains an explanation of the way in which the WLAN Security Control 
Framework was developed. Section 6.3 assesses the various information security control 
framework standards that were identified in Chapter 5 as being relevant to the WLAN 
Security Control Framework. The result of this assessment is a set of applicable 
components which is presented in section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses the structure of the 
WLAN Security Control Framework while section 6.6 presents the framework itself. 
Section 6.7 contains an explanation of how to use the framework using the Plan-Do-
Check-Act cycle, while section 6.8 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 The Development of the Framework 
In order to construct the WLAN Security Control Framework, the following process was 
followed (see Figure 6.1): 
 Some of the existing information security control framework standards were 
described in Chapter 5. 
 The security requirements for WLANs were discussed in Chapter 3. 
 The information technology and network requirements for SMMEs were 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Using the above information, an assessment was conducted on the information 
security control frameworks selected to identify which components would be 
applicable when securing WLANs in SMMEs. This exercise is depicted in Tables 
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 5 
for Information Security (COBIT 5), International Organisation for 
Standardisation and the International Electro-technical Commission 27002:2005 
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(ISO 27002), and Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practice 2012 (ISF 
SoGP) respectively. 
 The applicable components of the information security control frameworks were 
then extracted and are depicted in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 for COBIT 5, ISO 27002, 
and ISF SoGP respectively. 
 New controls were designed for the securing of WLANs in SMMEs using the WLAN 
threats and SMME classifications as identified in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
These new controls are presented in a control matrix in Table 6.7 and are classified 
under Physical Security, Technical Security, and Operational Security. 
 A WLAN Security Control Framework is depicted in Table 6.8 (Physical Security), 
Table 6.9 (Technical Security) and Table 6.10 (Operational Security). 
 Finally, the WLAN Security Control Framework is validated in Chapter 7. 
The next sections of this chapter will discuss this process in more detail. 
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Figure 6.1: Process for developing the WLAN Security Control Framework 
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6.3 Assessing Control Frameworks for Applicability 
Three information security control frameworks, as identified in Chapter 5, were assessed 
to identify which controls were applicable to the securing of WLANs in SMMEs. 
The first framework that was assessed was COBIT 5 and is presented in Table 6.1. The 
domains from COBIT 5 that were deemed applicable to the securing of WLANs in SMMEs 
are denoted as such in the table.  
Based on the discussion contained in Chapter 4 a number of items were deemed not 
applicable. For example, EDM02 in Table 6.1 was not deemed applicable to the securing 
of WLANs for SMMEs in view of the prior suggestion that, in general, SMMEs do not have 
at their disposal the resources for large investments in security. 
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Table 6.1: COBIT 5 domains assessed for applicability when securing WLANs in SMMEs 
COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
EDM01: Ensure Governance 
Framework Setting and 
Maintenance 
Y 
EDM01 ensures that the information security governance system is embedded in 
the enterprise and assurance is obtained as regards the information security 
governance system. EDM01 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it 
requires that an SMME addresses WLAN security as a critical business issue. 
EDM02: Ensure Benefits Delivery N 
EDM02 ensures that the benefits, costs, and risks of information security 
investments are both balanced and managed and contribute optimal value. 
EDM02 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
EDM03: Ensure Risk 
Optimisation 
N 
EDM03 ensures that information risk management is part of the overall enterprise 
risk management. EDM03 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
EDM04: Ensure Resource 
Optimisation 
N 
EDM04 ensures that information security resources are optimised and that 
information security resources are in alignment with business requirements. 
EDM04 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
EDM05: Ensure Stakeholder 
Transparency 
N 
EDM05 ensures that stakeholders are informed of the current status of 
information security and information risk throughout the enterprise. EDM05 is 
not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
APO01: Manage the IT 
Management Framework 
Y 
APO01 ensures the alignment of information security with the information 
technology (IT) and business frameworks operating in the enterprise. APO01 is 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that a WLAN security 
policy be documented and signed off by management. 
APO02: Manage Strategy N 
APO02 ensures that a comprehensive information security strategy is in place and 
is aligned with the overall enterprise and IT strategy. APO02 is not applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO03: Manage Enterprise 
Architecture 
N 
APO03 ensures that the information security architecture is understood as part of 
the overall enterprise architecture and is aligned and evolves with changes to the 
enterprise architecture. APO03 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO04: Manage Innovation N 
APO04 ensures that innovation in the information security programme is 
promoted and that information security requirements are taken into account 
when innovation is enabled. APO04 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO05: Manage Portfolio N 
APO05 ensures that information security investments are allocated in accordance 
with the risk appetite and that information security programme changes are 
reflected in relevant IT service, asset and resource portfolios. APO05 is not 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
APO06: Manage Budget and Costs N 
APO06 ensures that the allocation of the budget and costs for information security 
is prioritised effectively. APO06 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO07: Manage Human 
Resources 
Y 
APO07 ensures that human resource capabilities and processes are aligned with 
information security requirements. APO07 is applicable to WLAN security in 
SMMEs because it requires that staff members be trained on the general risks of 
WLANs and that accounts are disabled when a staff member leaves the 
organisation. 
APO08: Manage Relationships N 
APO08 ensures that coordination, communication and a liaison structure are 
established between the information security function and various other 
stakeholders. APO08 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO09: Manage Service 
Agreements 
N 
APO09 ensures service level agreements (SLAs) take into account information 
security requirements. APO09 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO10: Manage Suppliers N 
APO10 ensures that suppliers and contracts are assessed regularly and that 
appropriate risk mitigation plans are formulated. APO10 is not applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO11: Manage Quality N 
APO11 ensures that operational information security quality requirements for 
information security services are defined and implemented. APO11 is not 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
APO12: Manage Risk N 
APO12 ensures that the information security incident response is integrated with 
the overall risk management process to provide the capability to update the risk 
management portfolio. APO12 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
APO13: Manage Security Y 
APO13 ensures that a security plan has been put in place, accepted and 
communicated throughout the enterprise, as well as ensuring that information 
security solutions are implemented and operated consistently. APO13 is 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that an SMME's 
approach to WLAN security is governed by high security standards. 
BAI01: Manage Programmes and 
Projects 
N 
BAI01 ensures that information security requirements are considered and 
incorporated in all programmes and projects. BAI01 is not applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs. 
BAI02: Manage Requirements 
Definition 
N 
BAI02 ensures that all relevant information security aspects of business, 
functional and technical requirements are identified and implemented. BAI02 is 
not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
BAI03: Manage Solutions 
Identification and Build 
N 
BAI03 ensures that information security measures are embedded in the solution 
and effectively support the business strategic and operational objectives. BAI03 is 
not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
BAI04: Manage Availability and 
Capacity 
Y 
BAI04 ensures that information security requirements are included in the 
availability, performance and capacity management plans. BAI04 is applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that SMMEs deploy redundant 
access points throughout their offices. 
BAI05: Manage Organisational 
Change Enablement 
N 
BAI05 ensures that information security alerts and trends are used effectively 
both to enable change in the enterprise and to influence the enterprise 
information security culture. BAI05 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
BAI06: Manage Changes N 
BAI06 ensures that information security requirements are incorporated during 
impact assessments of processes, applications and infrastructure changes. BAI06 
is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
BAI07: Manage Change 
Acceptance and Transitioning 
N 
BAI07 ensures that information security testing is an integral component of 
acceptance testing and that the information security improvements identified are 
incorporated in future releases of software. BAI07 is not applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs. 
BAI08: Manage Knowledge N 
BAI08 ensures that knowledge sharing within an organisation is supported with 
the proper safeguards. BAI08 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
BAI09: Manage Assets N 
BAI09 ensures that all assets acquired meet information security requirements. 
BAI09 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
BAI10: Manage Configuration Y 
BAI10 ensures that information security configuration baselines are approved, 
implemented and maintained throughout the enterprise. BAI10 is applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that WLAN information and 
firmware software are stored in a secure place in order to facilitate repairs to 
access points and client devices. 
DSS01: Manage Operations Y 
DSS01 ensures that information security operations are performed in accordance 
with an information security operational plan. DSS01 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that SMMEs protect WLAN access points to 
ensure that business operations are able to continue in the event of an incident. 
DSS02: Manage Service Requests 
and Incidents 
N 
DSS02 ensures that an effective information security incident response 
programme is established and maintained. DSS02 is not applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs. 
DSS03: Manage Problems N 
DSS03 ensures that information security problems are solved in a sustainable 
way. DSS03 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
DSS04: Manage Continuity Y 
DSS04 ensures that information risk is properly identified and addressed in the 
information and communications technology continuity plan. DSS04 is applicable 
to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that SMMEs formulate a data 
  62 
COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
backup plan for WLAN devices in case of failure and which will allow for quick 
recovery. 
DSS05: Manage Security Services Y 
DSS05 ensures that the information processed on, stored on and transmitted by 
endpoint devices is protected. DSS05 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs 
because it requires that all users are uniquely identifiable and that they have 
access rights in accordance with their business roles. In addition, it requires that 
physical measures be implemented to protect information from unauthorised 
access, damage and interference when being processed, stored or transmitted. It 
also requires that electronic information is properly secured when stored, 
transmitted or destroyed. 
DSS06: Manage Business Process 
Controls 
Y 
DSS06 ensures that appropriate controls over information security processes are 
in place, reviewed and updated. DSS06 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs 
because it requires that processes are in place to distribute WLAN security keys 
in a secure way.  
MEA01: Monitor, Evaluate and 
Assess Performance and 
Conformance 
N 
MEA01 ensures that information security performance is monitored on an 
ongoing basis.  MEA01 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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COBIT 5 DOMAINS 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
MEA02: Monitor, Evaluate and 
Assess the System of Internal 
Control 
Y 
MEA02 ensures that information security controls are deployed and that they 
operate effectively.  MEA02 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it 
requires that access points are audited on a regular basis and log files are 
reviewed. 
MEA03: Monitor, Evaluate and 
Assess Compliance with External 
Requirements 
N 
MEA03 ensures that information security and information risk practices conform 
to external compliance requirements. MEA03 is not applicable to WLAN security 
in SMMEs. 
The second framework that was assessed was ISO 27002 ‒ See Table 6.2. The control clauses from ISO 27002 that were deemed to be 
applicable to the securing of WLANs in SMMEs are denoted as such in the table. 
As mentioned before, on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 4, some items were deemed not to be applicable. 
Table 6.2: ISO 27002 Control clauses assessed for applicability when securing WLANs in SMMEs 
ISO 27002 CONTROL CLAUSES 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
A.5: Security Policy Y 
A.5 ensures that management direction and support for information security are 
provided in accordance with business requirements as well as relevant laws and 
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ISO 27002 CONTROL CLAUSES 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
regulations. A.5 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that 
an SMME's overall approach to WLAN security supports high standards of 
governance and also that a WLAN security policy be documented and signed off by 
management. 
A.6: Organisation Information 
Security 
N 
A.6 ensures that a management framework is established to initiate and control 
the implementation of information security within the organisation and maintain 
the security of the organisation’s information and information processing facilities 
that are accessed, processed, communicated to, or managed by external parties. 
A.6 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
A.7: Asset Management Y 
A.7 ensures that all assets are accounted for and have a nominated owner. It also 
ensures that information is classified to indicate the need, priorities, and expected 
degree of protection when such information is handled. A.7 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that suitable controls are in place to protect 
WLAN devices from loss or theft. 
A.8: Human Resources Security Y 
A.8 ensures that employees, contractors and third party users understand their 
responsibilities, are equipped to support organisational security policies, and exit 
an organisation or change employment in an orderly manner. A.8 is applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that staff be trained in the general 
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ISO 27002 CONTROL CLAUSES 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
risks of WLANs and that accounts are disabled when a staff member leaves the 
organisation. 
A.9: Physical and Environmental 
Security 
Y 
A.9 ensures the prevention of unauthorised physical access, damage, and 
interference to the organisation’s premises and information. A.9 is applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that WLAN equipment is secured 
against malicious users gaining physical access. 
A.10: Communications and 
Operations Management 
Y 
A.10 ensures the correct and secure operation of information processing facilities, 
the appropriate level of information security and service delivery in line with third 
party service delivery agreements, the minimised risk of system failures, the 
integrity of software and information, the protection of information in networks, 
and the security of electronic commerce services. A.10 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that authentication be configured, WLAN 
access points are kept up to date, and WLAN information is secured. 
A.11: Access Control Y 
A.11 ensures that access to information is controlled and that unauthorised access 
is prohibited. A.11 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires 
that multiple access control (MAC) address filtering is applied, strong WLAN 
passwords are configured, and management interfaces on WLAN access points are 
secured. 
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ISO 27002 CONTROL CLAUSES 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
A.12: Information Systems 
Acquisition, Development and 
Maintenance 
Y 
A.12 ensures that security is an integral aspect of information systems and 
prevents errors, loss, unauthorised modification or misuse of information in 
applications. A.12 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires 
that WLAN device firmware is updated regularly. 
A.13: Information Security 
Incident Management 
N 
A.13 ensures that information security events and weaknesses associated with 
information systems are communicated in a manner which allows timely 
corrective action to be taken. A.13 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
A.14: Business Continuity 
Management 
Y 
A.14 ensures that interruptions to business activities are counteracted and 
protects critical business processes from the effects of either major failures of 
information systems or disasters. A.14 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs 
because it requires redundant WLAN devices be deployed to improve availability 
of systems as well as data backups and that recovery plans are put in place in the 
event of errors occurring. 
A.15: Compliance Y 
A.15 ensures that all breaches of any law, statutory, regulatory or contractual 
obligations are avoided and that security audits maximise effectiveness and 
minimise interferences. A.15 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it 
requires that WLAN access points be audited regularly to ensure authorised 
personnel only are using the WLAN. 
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The third and final framework that was assessed was ISF SoGP, which is presented in Table 6.3. The security areas from ISF SoGP that 
were deemed applicable to the securing of WLANs in SMMEs are denoted as such in the table. 
As mentioned before, based on the discussion in Chapter 4, some items were deemed not to be applicable. 
Table 6.3: ISF SoGP assessed for applicability when securing WLANs in SMME's. 
ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
SG1: Security Governance Approach Y 
SG1 ensures that an organisation’s overall approach to information security 
supports high standards of governance and provides a top-down management 
structure for co-ordinating security.  SG1 is applicable to WLAN security in 
SMMEs because it requires that an SMME's overall approach to WLAN security 
supports high standards of governance. 
SG2: Security Governance 
Components 
N 
SG2 ensures that the information security programme contributes to the 
organisation’s success and delivers value to the stakeholders as well as providing 
assurance that information risk is being adequately addressed. SG2 is not 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
SR1: Information Risk Assessment N 
SR1 enables individuals who are responsible for target environments to identify 
key information risks and determine the controls required to keep those risks 
within acceptable limits. SR1 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
SR2: Compliance N 
SR2 addresses compliance with the laws and regulations on information security 
and the prevention of information about individuals being used in an 
inappropriate manner. SR2 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF1: Security Policy and 
Organisation 
Y 
CF1 ensures that the documenting of the governing body’s direction on and 
commitment to information security and ensuring good practice in information 
security is applied effectively and consistently throughout the organisation. CF1 is 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that a WLAN security 
policy be documented and signed off by management. 
CF2: Human Resource Security Y 
CF2 ensures that staff members behave in a manner which is in accordance with 
the organisation’s information security policy and information security strategy 
by creating a security-positive culture in which all relevant individuals apply 
security controls and prevent critical and sensitive information from being 
compromised. CF2 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires 
that staff members be trained on the general risks of WLANs and that accounts 
are disabled when a staff member leaves the organisation. 
CF3: Asset Management N 
CF3 determines the level of protection that should be applied to particular types 
of information and the prevention of unauthorised disclosure as well as 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
supporting risk-based decisions regarding hardware and software. CF3 is not 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF4: Business Applications N 
CF4 ensures business applications use consistent security functionality that aligns 
with the organisation’s technical security infrastructure. CF4 is not applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF5: Customer Access N 
CF5 ensures that all aspects of customer access to the organisation’s business 
applications meet security requirements as well as ensuring that customers are 
legally and contractually bound to protect the organisation’s information. CF5 is 
not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF6: Access Management Y 
CF6 ensures that authorised individuals only are able to gain access to business 
applications, information systems, networks and computing devices, that 
individual accountability is assured and that authorised users are granted access 
privileges that are sufficient to enable them to perform their duties but do not 
permit them to exceed their authority. CF6 is applicable to WLAN security in 
SMMEs because it requires that authentication and strong passwords are 
configured on the WLAN. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
CF7: System Management Y 
CF7 ensures that computer system, network and telecommunication installations 
meet the security requirements of the critical business applications they support 
and that changes are applied correctly and do not compromise the security of 
business applications, computer systems or networks. CF7 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that backups of configurations are securely 
stored and that WLAN security keys are distributed when they are changed. 
CF8: Technical Security 
Infrastructure 
Y 
CF8 enables system developers and administrators to implement consistent, 
simple-to-use security functionality across multiple business applications and 
computer systems throughout the organisation. CF8 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that user identification is performed. This, 
in turn, allows for the improved auditing of user activity. 
CF9: Network Management Y 
CF9 ensures that the configuration of network devices is accurate and does not 
compromise the security of the network and that networks are configured 
accurately and securely. CF9 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it 
requires that WLAN access points are secured, WLAN site surveys are conducted 
on a regular basis and MAC address filtering is configured. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
CF10: Threat and Vulnerability 
Management 
Y 
CF10 addresses technical system and software vulnerabilities quickly and 
effectively in order to reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited and, 
consequently, having a serious impact on business. CF10 is applicable to WLAN 
security in SMMEs because it requires that the firmware of WLAN devices is 
updated regularly and log files are regularly reviewed. 
CF11: Incident Management N 
CF11 ensures that information security incidents are identified and resolved 
quickly and effectively, thus minimising their business impact and reducing the 
risk of similar incidents occurring. CF11 is not applicable to WLAN security in 
SMMEs. 
CF12: Local Environments N 
CF12 provides a high-level picture of the type and importance of the business 
conducted in the local environment. This, in turn, helps to support security 
decisions about activities relating to the local environment. CF12 is not applicable 
to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF13: Desktop Applications N 
CF13 ensures that accurate and up-to-date records of critical desktop applications 
are maintained, thus enabling them to be protected accordingly. CF13 is not 
applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
CF14: Mobile Computing Y 
CF14 ensures that critical and sensitive information handled by staff members 
working in remote environments is protected against the full range of security 
threats. CF14 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that 
WLAN client devices are encrypted and secured so as to provide protection 
against unauthorised individuals. 
CF15: Electronic Communications N 
CF15 ensures that messaging services are available when required, the 
confidentiality and integrity of messages are protected in transit, and the risk of 
misuse is minimised. CF15 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF16: External Supplier 
Management 
N 
CF16 ensures that critical and sensitive information is protected when being 
handled by external suppliers or when being transmitted between the 
organisation and the supplier. CF16 is not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF17: System Development 
Management 
N 
CF17 ensures that business applications (including those under development) 
meet business and information security requirements. CF17 is not applicable to 
WLAN security in SMMEs. 
CF18: System Development 
Lifecycle 
N 
CF18 ensures that systems are produced based on sound design principles and 
with security functionality built in, thus enabling controls to be incorporated 
easily, and withstand malicious attacks. CF18 is not applicable to WLAN security 
in SMMEs. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
CF19: Physical and Environment 
Security 
Y 
CF19 ensures physical access is restricted to authorised individuals, ensures that 
critical equipment is available when required and helps to prevent important 
services from being disrupted by the loss of, or damage to, equipment or facilities. 
CF19 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that WLAN 
equipment is secured against malicious users gaining physical access. 
CF20: Business Continuity Y 
CF20 enables the organisation to withstand the prolonged unavailability of 
critical information, business applications and related technical infrastructure, 
and provides individuals with a documented set of actions to perform in the event 
of a disaster. CF20 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires 
that redundant WLAN devices be deployed to improve availability as well as data 
backups and that recovery plans be put in place in case errors occur. 
SI1: Security Audit Y 
SI1 ensures that security controls have been implemented effectively and that 
risk is being managed. In addition, it provides the owners of target environments 
and executive management with an independent assessment of their security 
status. SI1 is applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs because it requires that 
WLAN access points are regularly audited by authorised personnel. 
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ISF SoGP SECURITY AREA 
DEEMED 
APPLICABLE 
(Y/N) 
DISCUSSION 
SI2: Security Performance N 
SI2 provides executive management with an accurate, comprehensive and 
coherent assessment of the information security status of the organisation. SI2 is 
not applicable to WLAN security in SMMEs. 
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6.4 COBIT 5, ISO 27002 and ISF SoGP Applicable Components 
This section summarises the extracted components from COBIT 5, ISO 27002, and ISF 
SoGP that were deemed to be applicable when securing WLANs in SMMEs. The processes 
and procedures of the extracted components were used in the development of the WLAN 
Security Control Framework. 
The COBIT 5 processes that were deemed to be applicable to the WLAN Security Control 
Framework are listed in Table 6.4: 
Table 6.4: COBIT 5 Domains and processes applicable to the WLAN Security Control Framework 
COBIT 5 DOMAIN APPLICABLE COBIT 5 PROCESSES 
Evaluate, Direct and Monitor EDM01: Ensure Governance Framework Setting and 
Maintenance 
Align, Plan and Organise 
 
APO01: Manage the IT Management Framework 
APO07: Manage Human Resources 
APO13: Manage Security 
Build, Acquire and 
Implement 
BAI04: Manage Availability and Capacity 
BAI10: Manage Configurations 
Deliver, Service and Support DSS01: Manage Operations 
DSS04: Manage Continuity 
DSS05: Manage Security Services 
DSS06: Manage Business Process Controls 
Monitor, Evaluate and Assess MEA02: Monitor, Evaluate and Assess the System of 
Internal Control 
The ISO 27002 main security categories that were deemed to be applicable to the WLAN 
Security Control Framework are listed in Table 6.5: 
Table 6.5: ISO 27002 Security clauses applicable to the WLAN Security Control Framework 
ISO 27002 CLAUSE 
A.5: Security Policy 
A.7: Asset Management 
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A.8: Human Resource Security 
A.9: Physical and Environmental Security 
A.10: Communications and Operations Management 
A.11: Access Control 
A.12: Information Systems Acquisition, Development and 
Maintenance 
A.14: Business Continuity Management 
A.15: Compliance 
The ISF SoGP topics that were deemed to be applicable to the WLAN Security Control 
Framework are listed in Table 6.6: 
Table 6.6: ISF SoGP Categories and areas applicable to the WLAN Security Control Framework 
ISF SoGP CATEGORIES APPLICABLE ISF SoGP AREAS 
SG: Security Governance SG1: Security Governance 
CF: Control Framework CF1: Security Policy and Organisation 
CF2: Human Resource Security 
CF6: Access Management 
CF7: System Management 
CF8: Technical Security Infrastructure 
CF9: Network Management 
CF10: Threat and Vulnerability Management 
CF14: Mobile Computing 
CF19: Physical and Environmental Security 
CF20: Business Continuity 
SI: Security Monitoring and 
Improvement 
SI1: Security Audit 
Each of the components identified in the information security control frameworks 
(COBIT 5, ISO 27002 and ISF SoGP) influenced the development of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework. The next section discusses the structure of the framework. 
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6.5 WLAN Security Control Framework Structure 
In order to explain the way in which the WLAN Security Control Framework was 
developed, a walkthrough is conducted below. 
1. Take the example of “APO07: Manage Human Resources” from COBIT 5 as 
presented in Table 6.4. 
2. APO07 was taken into account when a control activity for securing WLANs in 
SMMEs was created. This control activity was defined as “Train staff on the general 
risks of WLANs”. 
3. The following control objective was then derived, namely, “To provide staff 
members with the skills required to protect against the general risks of WLANs” 
and a detailed description was provided for the control activity. 
4. A decision was made regarding the general security area under which this control 
objective could be categorised, namely, physical security, technical security, or 
operational security. 
5. A reference code was added to the control activity name ‒ in this case “PS04” as it 
was deemed to fall under physical security (PS). 
6. A relevance indication was added, for example Fundamental (F) if it were 
applicable to all organisations or Specialised (S) if it were applicable to specific 
organisations only. PS04 was deemed to be of fundamental relevance. 
7. A SMME classification was provided to indicate whether it is applicable to micro, 
small and/or medium enterprises. PS04 was deemed to be applicable to small and 
medium enterprises. 
8. The threats that may possibly be mitigated by this control activity were indicated. 
For example, PS04 may mitigate social engineering, physical, and environmental 
threats. 
9. Finally, all the original information security control framework references were 
provided to enable the reader to investigate further details of the control activity. 
In this case, APO07 from COBIT 5 was similar to A.8 and A.9 from ISO 27002, and 
CF2 from ISF SoGP. 
10. These steps were repeated for all the COBIT 5 domains, ISO 27002 clauses, and 
ISF SoGP categories which had been deemed to be applicable to the securing of 
WLANs in SMMEs. 
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All of the information described above is included in Table 6.7, which presents a summary 
control matrix for the WLAN Security Control Framework. Further detailed information 
for the thirty-six control activities created is included in Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 which 
list the Physical Security (PS), Technical Security (TS), and Operational Security (OS) 
detail for the framework respectively. 
Note: The order of the security areas in this WLAN Security Control Framework does not 
imply their importance. All security areas are important and, thus, it is recommended that 
organisations apply the control activities that are applicable to their size. 
Figure 6.2 depicts the links between the information security control frameworks and the 
three security areas. All the control frameworks possessed components that were 
relevant to all the security areas used in the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
PHYSICAL 
SECURITY
TECHNICAL 
SECURITY
OPERATIONAL 
SECURITY
ISO 27002
COBIT 5 ISF SoGP
 
Figure 6.2: From information security control frameworks to security areas as adopted in the WLAN 
Security Control Framework 
The following subsections explain the components of the WLAN Security Control 
Framework in more detail. 
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6.5.1 Reference 
Each control activity in the WLAN Security Control Framework has a unique reference. 
These references include the security area under which the control activity falls and also 
the 2 digit number of the control activity (e.g. PS05 means Physical Security control 
number 05). 
6.5.2 Control Activity Name 
Each control activity is given a unique name that summarises the control description (i.e. 
PS05 ‒ Control access to secure areas). 
6.5.3 Security Relevance 
The WLAN Security Control Framework makes a distinction between those control 
activities that are considered Fundamental (F) and those that are considered Specialised 
(S). The aim of this classification is to make it easier to identify the essential security 
arrangements that are likely to be relevant for most organisations and to distinguish such 
essential security arrangements from those that depend on other factors that are not 
universal. 
 FUNDAMENTAL controls are the WLAN security arrangements that are generally 
applied by organisations to form the foundation of their wireless security. 
 SPECIALISED controls are those WLAN security arrangements that depend on 
how or in what environment the SMME operates and are not typically relevant to 
most organisations. 
PS04 is an example of a FUNDAMENTAL control is and PS05 is an example of a SPECIALISED 
control. 
6.5.4 Organisation Classification 
The control activities are classified as Micro, Small or Medium. This classification is used 
to distinguish the different levels of WLAN security requirements for SMMEs. The 
classifications are marked in the control matrix with a tick (✔) to enable to SMMEs to 
identify which controls are relevant to their organisations easily. The classification 
specifications of SMMEs were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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6.5.5 Threats Mitigated 
The threats mitigated component of the WLAN Security Control Framework advises the 
SMME on the risks which are reduced when the security control is applied. The following 
threats are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
 Malware threats ‒ The threat of malware to a WLAN is caused by malicious 
software which has been developed for the purpose of compromising information 
and harming WLAN devices. 
 Hacking threats ‒ The threats of WLANs being hacked involve unauthorised 
external individuals deliberately attempting to access or harm an organisation’s 
network by exploiting vulnerabilities and bypassing security controls. 
 Social engineering threats ‒ The threat of social engineering involves the use of 
social tactics to exploit an individual and influence him/her to perform specific 
actions such as disclosing WLAN authentication information. 
 Misuse threats ‒ The threat of misuse involves the unauthorised use of resources 
and privileges to gain access to information on a WLAN. 
 Physical threats ‒ Physical threats are typically associated with the loss or theft 
of WLAN equipment. 
 Error threats ‒ Error threats to WLANs are usually the result of one or more 
individuals making mistakes. 
 Environmental threats ‒ Environmental threats are typically associated with 
WLANs being affected by natural events, such as floods or storms, or man-made 
events, such as fires, explosions, riots or electrical interference. 
The threats mitigated are marked in the control matrix with a tick (✔). 
6.5.6 Control Objective 
Control objectives indicate what the control activities are trying to achieve, for example, 
PS05: To restrict access to secure areas to authorised personnel only by ensuring that 
individuals who are not authorised to access secure areas do not have such access). 
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6.5.7 Control Description 
The control description provides more detail on the control activity, including the steps 
that should be taken to implement the control. 
6.5.8 Reference to Information Security Control Frameworks 
Information security control frameworks were used as a source of information in order 
to construct the WLAN Security Control Framework. The WLAN Security Control 
Framework is referenced to these international standards so that, if required, more 
information on the topics may be found. 
6.6 WLAN Security Control Framework 
This section presents the WLAN Security Control Framework for SMMEs. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the framework consists of a control matrix table and detailed 
control tables for physical, technical and operational security. 
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Table 6.7: Control matrix for the WLAN Security Control Framework 
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PHYSICAL SECURITY 
PS01 Secure antennae and related 
cabling supporting WLANs. 
F   ✔ 
 
 ✔   ✔  ✔ 
PS02 Secure WLAN access points. F ✔ ✔ ✔      ✔  ✔ 
PS03 Secure WLAN client devices. F ✔ ✔ ✔      ✔  ✔ 
PS04 Train staff members on the 
general risks of WLANs. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
 
  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
PS05 Control access to secure areas. S   ✔    ✔  ✔  ✔ 
PS06 Conduct regular WLAN site 
surveys. 
S   ✔ 
 
 ✔ ✔     
PS07 Secure antennae so as to 
minimise coverage. 
F   ✔ 
 
 ✔      
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PS08 Deploy redundant WLAN access 
points. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
 
    ✔  ✔ 
PS09 Secure backups. F   ✔     ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
PS10 Protect WLAN access points with 
UPS. 
F   ✔ 
 
     ✔ ✔ 
TECHNICAL SECURITY 
TS01 Secure the SSID. F ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔    
TS02 Configure authentication. F ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔      
TS03 Configure MAC address filtering. F ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔      
TS04 Secure default WLAN access point 
settings. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
 ✔      
TS05 Require a valid password prior to 
administrator access. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
 ✔  ✔  ✔  
TS06 Configure user accounts. F  ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔    
TS07 Disable unused and dormant user 
accounts. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS08 Configure strong passwords. F ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔    
TS09 Disable responses to broadcast 
SSID probe. 
S   ✔ 
 
 ✔      
TS10 Perform user identification. F  ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔    
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TS11 Segregate WLANs from internal 
network. 
F   ✔ 
 
✔ ✔      
TS12 Secure gateways prior to 
accessing the internal network. 
F   ✔ 
 
✔ ✔      
TS13 Secure management interface on 
WLAN access points. 
F   ✔ 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS14 Secure SNMP. F   ✔   ✔  ✔    
TS15 Enable WPA2 encryption. F ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔      
TS16 Encrypt WLAN devices. F   ✔   ✔   ✔   
TS17 Encrypt data using high level 
protocols. 
F   ✔ 
 
 ✔      
TS18 Update WLAN device firmware. F ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔      
OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
OS01 Direct and monitor the WLAN 
Security Control Framework. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
 
   ✔    
OS02 Document a WLAN security 
policy. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
   ✔    
OS03 Distribute WPA2 encryption keys 
when changed. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
     ✔  
OS04 Audit WLAN access points. F  ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔    
OS05 Review log files. F  ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔  ✔  
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OS06 Store WLAN access point 
firmware versions. 
F   ✔ 
 
     ✔  
OS07 Store WLAN information. F   ✔       ✔  
OS08 Establish a data backup and 
recovery plan. 
F   ✔ 
 
   ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Table 6.8 presents the detailed control activities for the physical security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
Table 6.8: Physical security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework 
PHYSICAL SECURITY 
PS01 Secure antennae and related cabling supporting WLANs. 
Control Objective 
To protect antennae and related cabling that support WLANs from interception or damage. 
Control Description 
Antennae and related cabling that support the WLANs should be kept in a secure area to which access is restricted to 
authorised personnel only. Suitable physical access controls should be in place where WLAN access points are located.  The 
following WLAN security activities should be implemented: 
1. Attach identification labels to antennae and cables. 
2. Conceal the installation of antennae and cables. 
3. Avoid routing cables through publicly accessible areas. 
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4. Document diagrams to show where antennae and cables are located. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF19 
PS02 Secure WLAN access points. 
Control Objective 
To prevent unauthorised users or malicious users from gaining access physically to WLAN access points. 
Control Description 
WLAN access points should be kept in a secured closet or enclosure to which access is restricted to authorised personnel 
only. Malicious users who gain physical access to a WLAN access point are able to bypass all network security measures. 
Organisations should make sure that these WLAN access points are not located in common areas such as kitchens, canteens, 
or open offices. The following WLAN security activities should be implemented: 
1. Position the WLAN access points in secure environments (e.g. Locked rooms or cabinets). 
2. Document diagrams to show where WLAN access points are located. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF19 
PS03 Secure WLAN client devices. 
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Control Objective 
To prevent unauthorised users or malicious users from gaining access physically to WLAN devices. 
Control Description 
WLAN client devices should be protected from loss or theft. Suitable physical controls should be in place to lock down WLAN 
client devices. Loss or theft of a WLAN client device should be reported immediately to a network security team or other 
appropriate designated group that may take the appropriate measures within the organisation. Precautions should be taken 
to protect all WLAN client devices and support devices connected to the WLAN.  
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.7, A.9, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF14, CF19 
PS04 Train staff members on the general risks of WLANs. 
Control Objective 
To provide staff members with the skills required to provide protection against the general risks of WLANs. 
Control Description 
Staff members should be trained and educated on the general risks of WLANs. Staff members, including security teams, 
should be on the alert for trespassers with antennae, laptops or similar equipment. Such trespassers may be loitering in 
lobbies, parking lots or on pavements in order to intercept WLAN transmissions. Staff members should also be instructed to 
keep a lookout for unauthorised, rogue WLAN access points that may be installed on the organisation’s premises. It is 
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considered uncommon for WLAN access points on an organisation’s premises to be visible. The following WLAN security 
measures should be implemented: 
1. Educate, train and promote awareness on the part of all staff members as regards WLAN risks. 
2. Instruct staff members to be on the alert for rogue WLAN devices. 
COBIT 5: APO07 
ISO 27002: A.8, A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF2 
PS05 Control access to secure areas. 
Control Objective 
To restrict the access to secure areas to authorised personnel only by ensuring that individuals who are not authorised to 
access secure areas are not able to gain access to such areas. 
Control Description 
Access to secured areas should be controlled and logged. Mechanisms such as electronic key cards or biometrics should be 
required when accessing secure areas. Access to these secure areas should be audited on a regular basis to ensure that only 
those employees who are authorised to access such areas are able to gain access to the areas. The following security 
activities should be implemented: 
1. Make use of physical access control mechanisms (e.g. electronic key cards or biometrics). 
2. Review physical access control logs regularly. 
3. Perform regular audits on physical access lists in order to secure areas. 
.COBIT 5: DSS05, MEA02 
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ISO 27002: A.9, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF19 
PS06 Conduct regular WLAN site surveys. 
Control Objective 
To discover unauthorised, rogue WLAN access points on an organisation’s premises. 
Control Description 
Security teams should conduct regular WLAN site surveys to identify and locate unauthorised WLAN access points. SSID 
(Service Set Identifier), MAC address and encryption type are some of the characteristics to consider when looking for an 
unauthorised WLAN access point. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
PS07 Secure antennae as to minimise coverage. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that the organisation’s WLAN signal does not stray beyond the intended transmission area. 
Control Description 
The appropriate antennae should be selected for use with WLAN access points so as to reduce stray radio frequency (RF) 
transmissions. The selection of the correct antennae may reduce the signal strength to the intended transmission area. 
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WLAN access points with dedicated, omni-directional antennas should be located in such a way as to minimise RF coverage 
outside of the intended transmission area. 
1. Select the correct antennae as to reduce signal strength. 
2. Configure low power to limit the range of antennae. 
3. Place antennae in such locations so as to reduce stray RF transmissions. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
PS08 Deploy redundant WLAN access points. 
Control Objective 
Increasing the redundancy of WLAN access points improves the availability of the WLAN. 
Control Description 
For mission-critical WLAN access points, multiple devices should be deployed for the purposes of redundancy. In the event 
of a WLAN access point failure, WLAN client devices may be configured to automatically seek out another access point using 
the same SSID and WPA2 encryption keys. 
COBIT 5: BAI04 
ISO 27002: A.14 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF20 
PS09 Secure backups. 
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Control Objective 
To protect backups from access by unauthorised individuals. 
Control Description 
Backups contain sensitive configuration information, such as passwords and encryption keys, and should be accorded the 
same protection as the WLAN access point itself. The secured backups should be taken off-site. 
COBIT 5: DSS04 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7 
PS10 Protect WLAN access points with UPS. 
Control Objective 
To protect WLAN access points against power failures. 
Control Description 
Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) should be provided for the WLAN access points that are considered to be critical to 
business operations. These UPSs should be capable of supplying power for at least 15 minutes.  
COBIT 5: DSS01 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF19 
Table 6.9 presents the detailed control activities for the technical security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
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Table 6.9: Technical security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework 
TECHNICAL SECURITY 
TS01 Secure the SSID. 
Control Objective 
To ensure WLANs meet the security requirements of the organisation and that authorised individuals only gain access to the 
wireless network. 
Control Description 
The SSID used to identify a WLAN should be changed from the vendor default. Although the task of discovering an SSID is 
simple, default SSIDs are often an indication that a WLAN has not been secured and may entice the curious to explore. These 
SSIDs should not provide potentially useful information to malicious users. It is, thus, recommended that SSIDs are not set as 
values such as an organisation’s name, address, floor or department because this may provide for an attractive target for 
potential intruders. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
TS02 Configure authentication. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that only authorised individuals with access privileges gain access to an organisation’s WLAN. 
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Control Description 
Open system authentication should be disabled and should not be used. Open system authentication is a null authentication 
that grants any requesting WLAN client device access to the WLAN. The following WLAN security activities should be 
implemented: 
1. Disable open system authentication on WLAN access points. 
2. Configure access control mechanisms on WLAN access points such as user authentication or device authentication. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8, CF9 
TS03 Configure MAC address filtering. 
Control Objective 
To prevent unauthorised devices from gaining access to an organisation’s network. 
Control Description 
MAC address filtering should be used. MAC address filtering allows for a list of valid WLAN client devices MAC addresses to 
be specified. This list may be stored on either the access point itself or on a server that is consulted by the access point. 
WLAN client devices that are not included in this list are not allowed to associate with the WLAN. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
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TS04 Secure default WLAN access point settings. 
Control Objective 
To prevent unauthorised users from gaining access to an organisation’s network through default configurations. 
Control Description 
Disable or delete all unused, vendor-supplied, default accounts for the WLAN access point’s management interface. If a 
default account cannot be disabled or deleted, those accounts should be assigned a strong password. The following WLAN 
security activities should be implemented: 
1. Disable unnecessary or insecure user accounts. 
2. Different passwords to the default passwords set by suppliers must be set. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF7 
TS05 Require a valid password prior to administrator access. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that authorised users only gain access to administrator accounts. 
Control Description 
All WLAN access points should require and authenticate a valid password prior to privileged administrator access to the 
access point being granted. The following security activities should be implemented: 
  95 
1. Configure administrative passwords in such a way that they are not displayed on screen. 
2. Configure administrative password settings in such a way that they require strong characteristics. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF14 
TS06 Configure user accounts. 
Control Objective 
To restrict access to an organisation’s network to authorised users. 
Control Description 
Each user account, whether it represents either a person or a client device, should have a unique identifier that identifies 
one entity only within the organisation. The uniqueness of these accounts should be strictly maintained. Every user should 
have to make use of these unique identifiers prior to gaining access to the WLAN. For the purpose of effortless identification, 
all user accounts should include meaningful descriptions and naming conventions. This, in turn, simplifies the interpretation 
of the auditing reports. 
Users should not share a single user ID for WLAN access. Each user should access the WLAN by using his/her unique user ID 
to ensure the accurate accounting of user access and actions. Each user account should be assigned a password and these 
passwords should comply fully with the organisation’s password policies. All WLAN access points should require and 
authenticate a valid client device or user ID prior to access being granted to the WLAN. The following security activities 
should be implemented: 
1. Create user accounts for each user in the organisation. 
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2. Configure user accounts in such a way that they include meaningful descriptions. 
3. Assign passwords to user accounts. 
4. Prohibit user ID sharing. 
5. Review the list of user accounts on a regular basis. 
COBIT 5: DSS05, DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6 
TS07 Disable unused and dormant user accounts. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that user accounts are managed appropriately when employment is terminated or WLAN devices are either lost 
or stolen. 
Control Description 
Accounts should be deactivated within 24 hours of the notification of a status change (e.g. employee termination). User 
account passwords should be changed if a WLAN client device is either lost or stolen. If possible, the stolen WLAN client 
devices should be remotely wiped of all data. All unused and dormant user accounts should be disabled and then deleted. 
COBIT 5: APO07, DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.8, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF2, CF6 
TS08 Configure strong passwords. 
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Control Objective 
To prevent unauthorised users from gaining access to an organisation’s password protected network. 
Control Description 
Password changes should be enforced periodically and, at least, every 90 days. Changing passwords on a regular basis 
ensures that, even if a malicious user does obtain access to a WLAN using a compromised password, then the password 
would be valid for a finite time only. In addition, passwords should not be reused. Disallowing password reuse prevents 
users from repeating their passwords when periodic changes are enforced. In order to avoid one system being compromised 
as a result of other systems being compromised, users should not use the same password for the WLAN that they use 
elsewhere (e.g. Windows). 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8 
TS09 Disable responses to broadcast SSID probe. 
Control Objective 
To ensure authorised devices only gain access to an organisation’s network. 
Control Description 
The responses to broadcast SSID probe requests should be disabled on the WLAN access points. The disabling of the 
broadcast SSID probe requests will prevent the access point from being seen by numerous site survey tools. 
COBIT 5: Not covered in COBIT 5 
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ISO 27002: Not covered in ISO 27002 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
TS10 Perform user identification. 
Control Objective 
To restrict access to WLANs to authorised users only using user identification. 
Control Description 
User identification should be performed instead of client device identification. This provides for improved auditing 
especially in situations in which multiple users share a client device. A unique individual client or user identifier should be 
used when authenticating each client device or user. Multiple client devices or people should not share a single, common 
identifier. 
COBIT 5: DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8 
TS11 Segregate WLANs from internal network. 
Control Objective 
To ensure WLANs meet the security requirements of an organisation’s network. 
Control Description 
WLANs should be treated as a non-trusted network, similar to the Internet. Firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) 
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should be used to segregate the WLAN from the organisation’s internal network. Network segregation should be performed 
by means of the physical separation of dedicated network equipment and wiring and not through using Virtual LANs 
(VLANs). VLANs have proven to be susceptible to attacks, potentially allowing an attacker to gain access.  
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
TS12 Secure gateways prior to accessing the internal network. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that authorised individuals only gain access to an organisation’s network by authentication prior to access. 
Control Description 
Users should securely authenticate themselves to a gateway prior to gaining access to the organisation’s internal network. 
Authentication methods include those provided by a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)-
encrypted login page. Access through the gateway should be restricted to those network destinations and services only that 
are required. This limits possible attack routes from the external WLAN to the internal network. This implies that, if WLAN 
users only require access to an organisation’s email server, then the WLAN does not need access to the organisation’s 
financial systems. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF9 
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TS13 Secure management interface on WLAN access points. 
Control Objective 
To ensure the protection of WLAN access point management interfaces. 
Control Description 
All network services listening on a WLAN access point's wireless network interface should either be disabled or have access 
denied from the wireless network addresses. In particular, access point management services should never be accessible via 
the wireless interface. Unused management server interfaces on WLAN access points should either be disabled or have 
restricted access. Many WLAN access points provide multiple configuration interfaces such as serial console ports, Telnet, 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), etc. Access to management server interfaces should be restricted to specific hosts only and 
encrypted protocols should be used when communicating with these WLAN management servers in order to enhance 
confidentiality and provide data integrity. All access to the WLAN management server interfaces should be authenticated. 
The following WLAN security activities should be implemented: 
1. Disable all unused management interfaces on WLAN access points. 
2. Restrict management interfaces to specific hosts. 
3. Authenticate all access to management interfaces. 
4. Encrypt all administrative traffic to management interfaces. 
5. Configure WLAN access points using the serial console interface. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
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TS14 Secure SNMP. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that the configuration of the SNMP is secure and does not compromise the organisation’s network. 
Control Description 
The SNMP should be disabled if it is not required and is not being used. The latest version of the SNMP protocol should be 
installed and the support for earlier versions of SNMP disabled. At the time of this study the SNMP versions to be used, in 
order of preference, are: 
a) SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy 
b) SNMPv3 with authentication only 
c) SNMPv2p with MD5 authentication 
Predefined community strings such as “public” or “private” should be removed. SNMP community strings and passwords 
should be complex and reflect the principles of strong passwords. Different community strings and passwords should be 
used for each WLAN access point within the organisation. This requirement is particularly critical if the SNMP has read-
write access to WLAN access points. WLAN access points should be configured to accept SNMP requests from specific hosts 
only, for example, a corporate SNMP management station. All SNMP communication should be authenticated and encrypted 
between the WLAN access point and management station. SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy satisfies this 
requirement. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
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ISF SoGP: CF9 
TS15 Enable WPA2 encryption. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that all WLAN traffic is encrypted and protected against interception. 
Control Description 
WPA2 encryption should be enabled on all WLAN access points. Open authentication should be disabled and WLAN access 
points should reject unencrypted data packets. Older encryption standards, such as WEP and WPA, should not be used. 
WPA2 encryption keys should be changed on a regular basis. Changing WPA2 encryption keys frequently ensures 
confidentiality. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
TS16 Encrypt WLAN devices. 
Control Objective 
To ensure critical organisation information is encrypted and protected against unauthorised individuals. 
Control Description 
All WLAN devices that are connected to an organisation’s network should be encrypted. The encryption adds an extra layer 
of security in the event of either the loss or theft of the WLAN device. 
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COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF14 
TS17 Encrypt data using high level protocols. 
Control Objective 
To ensure the integrity of all WLAN data transmitted. 
Control Description 
All data transmitted across the WLAN should be encrypted using a high level encryption protocol that ensures data 
confidentiality. Such protocols include Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH) and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
VPN tunnels. 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
TS18 Update WLAN device firmware. 
Control Objective 
To ensure the latest security patches are installed on WLAN devices. 
Control Description 
WLAN access points and client device firmware should be updated regularly. This, in turn, addresses security vulnerabilities 
  104 
or critical bugs that have been found while also taking advantage of new security or management features that have been 
added. Information Technology (IT) administrators should stay abreast of firmware patches and WLAN security 
announcements so that security holes and other critical bugs may be patched on a timely basis.  
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.12 
ISF SoGP: CF10 
Table 6.10 presents the detailed control activities for the operational security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
Table 6.10: Operational security area of the WLAN Security Control Framework 
OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
OS01 Direct and monitor the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that the organisation’s overall approach to WLAN security supports high standards of governance. 
Control Description 
An organisation’s governing body should establish, direct, monitor and communicate the WLAN Security Control 
Framework. By introducing the WLAN Security Control Framework the governing body would have demonstrated its 
commitment to WLAN security in the organisation. The following WLAN security activities should be implemented: 
1. Treat WLAN security as a critical business issue. 
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2. Appoint an individual to take overall responsibility for WLAN security. 
3. Sign off the WLAN security policy. 
COBIT 5: EDM01, APO13 
ISO 27002: A.5 
ISF SoGP: SG1 
OS02 Document a WLAN security policy. 
Control Objective 
To document the governing body’s direction on and commitment to WLAN security. 
Control Description 
There should be a documented WLAN security policy, signed off by the governing body, and that applies throughout the 
organisation. The WLAN security policy should define what WLAN security is and indicate the security principles that 
should be adhered to by all staff members. The following WLAN security activities should be implemented: 
1. Align the WLAN security policy with other high level policies. 
2. Communicate the policy to all staff members and external individuals. 
3. Review the WLAN security policy on a regular basis. 
COBIT 5: APO01 
ISO 27002: A.5 
ISF SoGP: CF1 
OS03 Distribute WPA2 encryption keys when changed. 
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Control Objective 
To ensure that all staff members have ongoing access to the WLAN. 
Control Description 
In order to facilitate the update of the WPA2 encryption keys used in WLANs, IT administrators should distribute the new 
keys to an organisation’s WLAN user population whenever the WPA2 encryption keys are changed. 
COBIT 5: DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
OS04 Audit WLAN access points. 
Control Objective 
To ensure WLAN access points are accessed by authorised personnel only. 
Control Description 
WLAN access points should include the following minimum set of events that should be audited: 
1. Administration account logon and logoff success and failure. 
2. Access point configuration changes. 
3. Attempts to connect to access point management interfaces from unauthorised devices. 
4. All WLAN authentication attempts, whether successful or not. 
COBIT 5: MEA02 
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ISO 27002: A.10, A.15 
ISF SoGP: SI1 
OS05 Review log files. 
Control Objective 
To ensure that security events are recorded and identified. 
Control Description 
Authorised personnel should review log files on a regular basis to ensure that any signs of security violations are detected, 
and appropriate action is taken. Log files should be stored on alternate media, such as backup tapes, and should be retained 
for a minimum of 30 days. Additional auditing should be performed for interesting events, such as repeated WLAN probe 
requests for the broadcast SSID “ANY”. Such events may indicate a malicious user searching for WLAN access points. 
COBIT 5: MEA02 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: SI1, CF10 
OS06 Store WLAN access point firmware versions. 
Control Objective 
To promptly repair WLAN access points if a system failure were to occur. 
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Control Description 
The WLAN access point firmware version and feature set that is installed should be stored in case of system failure, recovery 
or reconfiguration. 
COBIT 5: BAI10 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF14 
OS07 Store WLAN information. 
Control Objective 
To ensure WLAN information is easily accessible when needed. 
Control Description 
The WLAN access point serial numbers, hardware manufacturers, model names, vendor contact information and applicable 
warranty information should be stored in order to facilitate repairs. In addition, a list of all people with administrative 
privileges on the WLAN access points should be stored. 
COBIT 5: BAI10 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF9 
OS08 Establish a data backup and recovery plan. 
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Control Objective 
To ensure WLAN operations may be recovered speedily when errors occur. 
Control Description 
A data backup and recovery plan should be formulated for WLAN access points and related systems configurations so as to 
protect against configuration data loss. The backup and recovery process should be tested to ensure that it works in 
practice. 
COBIT 5: DSS04 
ISO 27002: A.14 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF20 
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6.7 Using the WLAN Security Control Framework 
This section describes a procedure for the implementation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework by presenting the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, followed by a 
sample scenario. 
6.7.1 Plan-Do-Check-Act 
An organisation’s management cycle typically consists of defining objectives and 
strategy, implementing operational plans, evaluating on going progress, 
enhancing performance and responding to both internal and external factors 
(ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
The “Plan–Do–Check–Act” (PDCA) cycle is used by various organisations to 
implement quality management and the continuous improvement of information 
security management systems (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). The PDCA cycle was 
identified as a suitable process that may be used for implementing WLAN security 
in SMMEs. In addition, it also meets the research objective of developing and 
implementing a WLAN security control framework for SMMEs. Figure 6.3 depicts 
the PDCA cycle which is discussed below. 
 
Figure 6.3: The PDCA Cycle (Redrawn and simplified from ISO/IEC 27001, 2005) 
•Evaluate the 
implementation
•Determine need 
for improvement
•Implement the 
plan
•Plan the 
implementation
Plan Do
CheckAct
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 Plan ‒ The first step (plan stage) involves planning the implementation of 
the WLAN Security Control Framework by establishing the objectives and 
identifying the controls relevant to the organisation. 
 Do ‒ After the plan has been formulated, the next step (do stage) involves 
implementing the plan and executing the controls. It is during this step that 
an organisation should gain a sound understanding of the security 
environment. 
 Check ‒ The next step (check stage) involves evaluating the overall 
implementation of the controls and comparing them with the expected 
results. 
 Act ‒ During the next step (act stage), the implementation is concluded by 
determining which of the controls need to be improved. 
The four steps of the PDCA cycle should be repeated continuously until there is no 
more need for improvement.  
6.7.2 Example Scenario 
A small legal firm in South Africa is concerned about security. The firm employs 6 
staff members whose laptop computers are all connected wirelessly to the 
company network. The company has recently been experiencing a degradation in 
network performance and suspects that unauthorised persons are gaining access 
to the WLAN. 
6.7.2.1 Plan 
The intention of the legal firm is to find a solution for the degradation of the 
network performance and to identify the controls that are relevant to its problem. 
According to the SMME classification presented in Table 4.2, this firm may be 
classified as a small enterprise (6–50 employees). When applying the WLAN 
Security Control Framework to the hacking problem mentioned above, the 
following controls are deemed to be relevant for a small enterprise, namely, TS01, 
TS02, TS03, TS04, TS05, TS06, TS07, TS08, TS10, TS15, TS18, OS04, and OS05. 
These were identified by scrutinising the control matrix presented in Table 6.7 
and extracting the controls where there are ticks in both the “SMALL” and 
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“HACKING” columns. It would appear from the table that all of these controls are 
fundamental and, therefore, they must all be implemented. It may be noted that a 
control may mitigate more than just the “HACKING” threat. For example, TS01 will 
mitigate the “MISUSE” threat as well as the “HACKING” threat for small 
enterprises. 
It is possibly recommended that micro sized businesses give the framework to 
their outsourced IT technician to use when installing a WLAN. 
6.7.2.2 Do 
The next step involves implementing the plan and executing the controls, in this 
case, TS01. In other words, TS01 would have been identified as a fundamental 
control which must be implemented in order to protect the legal firm against 
hacking. The control activity name for TS01 is “Secure the SSID”. It is clear from 
Table 6.9 that the objective of this control is to ensure that WLANs meet the 
security requirements of the organisation in question and that authorised 
individuals only may gain access to the WLAN. It is also clear from reading the 
control description of TS01 in Table 6.9 that the default SSID supplied by a vendor 
is public knowledge and, thus, it constitutes a security risk for potential malicious 
users. Accordingly, it is imperative that it should be changed immediately when 
the WLAN is set up. If the legal firm wishes to read further about the background 
to this control it may refer to COBIT 5: DSS05, ISO 27002: A.10, and/or ISF SoGP: 
CF7 and CF9 as shown in the table under control TS01. 
All the WLAN Security Control Framework controls identified in the plan stage 
may be implemented in this manner. 
6.7.2.3 Check 
The next step involves evaluating the implementation of the controls and 
ascertaining whether there has been an improvement in the performance of the 
firm’s network. 
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6.7.2.4 Act 
To conclude the implementation of the controls it is necessary in order to 
determine which of the controls need to be improved. Based on the outcome of 
this stage, it may be necessary to repeat the Plan-Do-Check-Act stages. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the WLAN Security Control Framework for SMMEs. 
The WLAN Security Control Framework was developed from a number of 
international standards, namely, COBIT 5 for Information Security (COBIT 5), 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (ISO 27002) and the ISF Standard of Good Practice 2012 (ISF 
SoGP). The contents of the framework were separated into three security areas, 
namely, physical security, technical security, and operational security. Each item 
in the framework was accompanied by controls that would assist in mitigating 
threats identified to SMMEs in South Africa. A process for using the framework 
was also proposed using the PDCA cycle with a sample scenario. 
It is essential that the WLAN Security Control Framework be validated and, thus, 
this is the focus of the next chapter. 
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7 Validation of the WLAN Security Control Framework 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Security Control 
Framework for small, medium and micro sized enterprises. This chapter reports 
on the validation of the WLAN Security Control Framework. It was important to 
validate both the quality and the usability of the control framework in order to 
ensure its value. Section 2.2.4 discussed possible methods for the validation of the 
control framework. Section 7.2 suggests a focus group as a validation method 
while section 7.3 explains the development of the validation instrument. The 
composition of the focus group is discussed in section 7.4 and this is followed by 
the feedback of the focus group presented in section 7.5. Section 7.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
7.2 The Focus Group as a Validation Method 
In order to validate the WLAN Security Control Framework and as discussed in 
section 2.2.4, a focus group was conducted. A focus group was deemed to be useful 
for this validation exercise because it allowed multidisciplinary participants to 
interact without there being any pressure to reach agreement on the process. The 
multidisciplinary composition of the focus group enabled a broad range of 
responses which, in turn, enabled a number of different issues to be discussed. An 
instrument was created for use in the validation process. This instrument took the 
form of a questionnaire which was intended to collect qualitative data. 
7.3 Creation of the Validation Instrument 
In order to facilitate the validation process by means of a focus group, an 
instrument was developed. This instrument consisted of several statements 
relating to the WLAN Security Control Framework and invited the members of the 
focus group to comment on the statements. Before using the instrument, a 
presentation was delivered to the focus group. The presentation contained a brief 
overview of the framework and presented sample scenarios. The scenarios 
typically included various types of business and the related security risks. The 
framework was then applied to the scenarios and the focus group determine 
whether the framework presented appropriate solutions to the security problems. 
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The presentation and the scenarios as well as the instrument used in the 
validation process are contained in Appendix B. 
7.4 Composition of the Focus Group 
The focus group comprised ten people – eight participants and the researcher and 
the research supervisor. The researcher formally presented the framework and 
the scenarios but did not take part in the focus group discussion. The research 
supervisor was also present to act as a facilitator for any questions asked in order 
to ensure there was no bias. The eight members of the focus group were 
information technology (IT) professionals with the following experience: 
 Doctoral students in IT Information Security 
 Master’s degree holders in IT Information Security and Networking 
 Bachelor degree holders in IT Networking 
 IT governance specialists 
 Networking specialists (including wireless networks) 
 Information security specialists 
The aim of the focus group was to validate the WLAN Security Control Framework. 
Two scenarios were presented to the group together with the framework. 
7.5 Overview of the Feedback 
The members of the focus group were requested to indicate whether they agreed 
or disagreed with a number of statements. The range of answers included five 
options, namely, fully disagree, partially disagree, neutral, partially agree, and 
fully agree. There was also a space for the members to provide reasons for their 
choices regarding each statement. 
Statement 1 referred to the members’ qualifications, work experience, and job 
descriptions (summarised above). 
Statement 2: The framework is laid out logically and, therefore, it is easy to 
understand. 
All of the members either fully agreed or partially agreed with the statement. 
Accordingly, the researcher assumed that the WLAN Security Control Framework 
  
117 
is, in fact, logically laid out and easy to understand and that no further work was 
required in order to improve it. 
Statement 3: The way in which the framework is used is intuitive and, therefore, a 
small business owner would be able to use it. 
Six of the 8 focus group members either fully agreed or partially agreed with the 
statement while the remaining 2 were neutral. Three indicated that micro 
business users would require training in how to use the framework while one 
member also mentioned that smaller businesses may find that implementing the 
framework would take up too much time. The researcher took cognisance of the 
fact that it may involve too much work for small businesses to implement the 
framework. However, it is not possible to remove controls without introducing 
additional security risks into the environment. A recommendation from the focus 
group was that micro businesses give the framework to their outsourced IT 
technicians to use when installing a WLAN. This recommendation was, thus, 
added to the plan phase of the scenario as discussed in section 6.7.2.1 where 
procedures for the implementation for the framework are suggested. 
Statement 4: As regards Scenario 1 ‒ a small legal firm with a hacking problem ‒ the 
framework suggests sensible and appropriate security controls. 
Seven of the 8 focus group members either fully agreed or partially agreed with 
the statement while the remaining member was neutral. The latter had had no 
experience in personally implementing security controls and, thus, he/she was 
not in a position to comment. Accordingly, the researcher concluded that the 
framework serves its purpose. 
Statement 5: As regards Scenario 2 ‒ a new micro business ‒ the framework suggests 
sensible and appropriate security controls. 
Six of the eight members either fully agreed or partially agreed with the statement 
while the remaining members were neutral. It was mentioned again that smaller 
businesses may find the controls too technical in nature although it was agreed 
that the controls were appropriate. Accordingly, the researcher concluded that the 
framework serves its purpose. 
  
118 
In the extra comments that were provided there was a suggestion of a software 
programme or a toolbox for implementing the framework. Another comment 
indicated that an enterprise without an IT department would require additional 
explanations on implementing the controls. Section 6.7.2.2 suggested further 
reading on the background of the controls in the information security control 
framework standards. 
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter described the validation of the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which had been developed in order to ensure its quality. 
The main aim of the focus group was to ascertain whether the research study has 
had contributed to addressing the gaps identified in current approaches for 
securing WLANs in small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) (see section 
1.5).  
At the end of the validation it was concluded that the WLAN Security Control 
Framework was logically set out, easy to use and that it recommended sensible 
and appropriate controls for the given scenarios and, thus, it was deemed to serve 
its purpose. The researcher does, however, take cognisance of the fact that certain 
small businesses may require training in the use of the framework. 
Thus, the results from the focus group support the notion that this research study 
has contributed to addressing the gaps identified in current approaches for 
securing WLANs in SMMEs. It may, thus, be concluded that the WLAN Security 
Control Framework developed may be deemed to be valid. 
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8 Conclusion 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology
This chapter explains the research process adopted in the study.
Chapter 3: WLAN Technologies
This chapter discusses the various WLAN technologies available.
Chapter 4: WLAN Technologies in SMMEs
This chapter classifies SMMEs and examines their WLAN 
infrastructure.
Chapter 5: Information Security Control Frameworks
This chapter itemises those aspects of various information 
security control frameworks that are suitable for WLANs.
Chapter 6: WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter presents the WLAN Security Control Framework 
which was developed.
Chapter 7: Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework
This chapter discusses the validation of the WLAN Security 
Control Framework.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief summary of all chapters, 
demonstrating how each chapter contributed towards the 
realisation of the research objectives.
Part 1: 
Introduction
Part 2: 
Background
Part 3: 
Framework
Part 4:
Conclusion
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the study.
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the research study. Section 8.2 details the results of the 
study, section 8.3 summarises the contribution made by the study and section 8.4 
discusses the limitations of the study. Section 8.5 contains suggestions for further 
research while section 8.6 concludes the study. 
8.2 Results of the Research 
As discussed in the study, information technology is important for modern 
businesses and brings numerous benefits by enabling communication and 
creating opportunities. This is especially true for small businesses which are now 
able to transact with larger organisations as a result of their ability to 
communicate electronically by means of networking. 
In view of the reliance of businesses on their information and technology 
resources, it is important that these resources are protected to prevent any loss of 
business. Companies may use the international information security framework 
standards as discussed in this dissertation. However, these standards may not 
necessarily be appropriate for small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in 
South Africa. In fact, the researcher conducted a small survey to determine 
whether SMMEs in South Africa currently use WLANs and how these WLANs are 
protected. The details of this survey are contained in Appendix A. 
It emerged from the survey that WLANs are used extensively by SMMEs but there 
is a lack of WLAN security controls. The latter was seen as a problem and led to 
this research endeavour. 
The primary objective of this study was, therefore, to develop a framework that 
small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) may use to implement wireless 
local area network (WLAN) security. This framework, termed the WLAN Security 
Control Framework, was based on applicable security standards and best 
practices. 
In order to achieve the primary research objective, it was necessary to realise the 
following sub-objectives. The procedure followed used to realise the primary 
research objective is also described below: 
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 Determine the needs of SMMEs with regard to WLAN security. 
o Chapter 3 examined WLAN technologies, threats, and security. It was 
identified that WLANs have different security requirements as 
compared to wired networks. The typical threats that face WLANs 
were identified and the security controls to mitigate these threats 
were discussed in terms of physical security, technical security, and 
operational security. 
o Chapter 4 began by classifying SMMEs in Table 4.2 and proceeded 
with a detailed discussion of the WLAN technologies that may be used 
by SMMEs. It was realised that WLANs were more suitable to SMMEs 
than wired networks. However, it was suggested that, as compared to 
larger organisations, SMMEs do not have the resources, knowledge, 
and skills required to secure WLANs effectively. Thus, for SMMEs to 
put effective WLAN security controls in place, a framework to assist 
them would be valuable. 
 Investigate existing security control framework standards that govern 
WLANs. 
o Chapter 5 investigated a number of security control framework 
standards which may be used to govern an organisation’s 
information security. The three frameworks identified as applicable 
to this research study included the following; Control Objectives for 
Information and Related Technology 5 for Information Security 
(COBIT 5),  International Organisation for Standardisation and the 
International Electro-technical Commission 27002:2005 (ISO 
27002), and Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practice 
2012 (ISF SoGP). However, although these security frameworks 
included some network security controls, these were not specifically 
tailored for securing WLANs. However, it was decided that certain 
aspects of these security controls could be extracted and adapted for 
the purposes of securing WLANs. 
 Determine the components that should form part of a WLAN Security 
Control Framework to support SMME needs in South Africa. 
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o It emerged from an examination of the three security control 
framework standards which were discussed in Chapter 5 that these 
frameworks were not entirely suitable for SMMEs as they were aimed 
at larger corporations and for experienced security professionals. 
SMMEs would not always have the security staff necessary to 
understand and implement these controls. 
o An assessment was conducted of the information security control 
framework standards in that they were analysed for relevance to the 
research topic. This exercise was illustrated in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. 
o A number of controls from the security control framework standards 
were, therefore, extracted and listed based on their relevance to the 
securing of WLAN implementations in SMMEs. Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 
depict the controls extracted. 
o Using all the information collected, new controls for the WLAN 
Security Control Framework were designed and presented in a 
control matrix as depicted in Table 6.7. The detailed contents of the 
framework was classified under three security areas, namely, 
physical security, technical security, and operational security ‒ See 
Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 respectively. The framework presented 
security controls that would assist in mitigating the WLAN threats 
identified to SMMEs in South Africa. 
The realisation of the sub-objectives discussed above and subsequent validation 
process meant that the primary research objective of this study was achieved. 
8.3 Contribution of the Research Study 
Regarding the significance of the research study, it was found that the 
international security control framework standards were not suitable for the 
securing of WLANs in SMMEs. This is primarily as a result of the fact that these 
standards are tailored for larger organisations with expert security staff and the 
considerable resources required to implement the controls. The primary 
contribution of this research study is, therefore, the WLAN Security Control 
Framework for SMMEs in South Africa. The implementation of this framework will 
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help SMMEs improve the state of their WLAN security by providing them with 
protection against the escalating threats of malware, hacking, social engineering, 
misuse, physical threats, error threats and environmental threats. A research 
paper presenting this framework was prepared and will be submitted to a 
relevant subject specific journal. The draft paper is contained in Appendix C. 
8.4 Limitations of the Research 
In view of time and resource constraints on the part of the researcher the WLAN 
Security Control Framework has not been tested in real-world situations. It was, 
however, validated by means of a focus group and using sample scenarios. 
Nevertheless, the researcher acknowledges that this is a weakness and that 
further validations should take place to ensure the effective implementation of the 
framework for WLANs in SMMEs.  
8.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
There are a number of areas in which further research may be conducted. It would 
be beneficial if the WLAN Security Control Framework were to be implemented in 
an SMME to ensure that the framework covers all the possible WLAN security 
threats. It would also benefit SMMEs if an implementation guide were developed 
to assist them. In addition, another security control framework for SMMEs for end-
to-end security would also be useful. For larger organisations a more detailed 
WLAN Security Control Framework would be required. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Small, medium and micro enterprises play a vital role in the South African 
economy. These companies are becoming increasingly reliant on WLANs to 
provide business communication. It is, therefore, vital to assist these enterprises 
with the protection of their WLAN infrastructure. The researcher hopes that this 
dissertation will help in providing assistance to SMMEs and also encourage other 
researchers to contribute to this topic.  
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10 Appendices 
Several documents have been included as appendices for additional information 
purposes. The documents include the following: 
1. Appendix A: Survey Results 
2. Appendix B: Focus Group Validation Presentation and Instruments 
3. Appendix C: Draft Journal Paper 
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10.1 Appendix A: Survey Results 
There is not much literature available that is specific to the use of WLAN security 
amongst small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. 
Accordingly, the researcher conducted a survey to determine whether there was 
a need for a WLAN Security Control Framework aimed specifically at securing 
WLANs in SMMEs. 
The South African SMME population is so large that a sample group was chosen 
and the findings generalised to the entire population of SMME’s.  
A pilot study was first conducted on a small group of the population. This was done 
in order to identify problems in the survey (e.g. misunderstood questions, 
unexpected responses). 
The survey data was collected using a web survey tool provided by the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University. The survey was posted as a link on various 
SMME forums and sent by email to various companies 
(http://www.nmmu.ac.za/websurvey/q.asp?sid=310&k=hsoiusptdm). 
A total of 64 companies participated in the survey, including micro, small, medium 
and large enterprises. The data received from these companies was then analysed 
with the expectation that each question would have different outcomes because 
the respondents had answered from a departmental, divisional or organisational 
viewpoint. In some cases the respondents were clearly unaware of the answer to 
the question and had probably guessed. 
Every member from within an organisation ‒ from a human resource employee to 
an IT administrator ‒- had an equal chance of being included in the sample. 
Accordingly, the sample was selected randomly. Employees from all departments 
in various organisations had participated in the survey as SMMEs do not always 
have a dedicated IT department. This, in turn, implies that all the data collected 
did not give preference to any particular members of the population. Employees 
of the companies were asked for their opinions in order to ascertain whether they 
were aware of WLAN security. 
The questions in the survey were intended to find out how many people were 
employed in the companies as this would indicate whether the companies were 
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micro, small, medium or large in size. The companies also indicated whether they 
made use of a WLAN and whether they had adequate WLAN security in place. Two 
types of measurements were used when designing the questions, namely, nominal 
measurements and ratio measurements. In addition to choosing these 
measurements, closed questions were used, thus restricting the respondent to 
selecting a specific answer from a list of possible answers. 
The data was gathered online using the web survey tool mentioned earlier. This 
tool collected the data in a spreadsheet format. The answers in the columns of the 
spreadsheet were added together and the totals were analysed. The totals 
collected were then expressed in graphical format using pie charts and bar graphs. 
This was done by taking the total number of small, medium or micro sized 
businesses and calculating the percentages of people who had answered either 
yes or no in the survey. 
The questions are listed below: 
Question 1: How many people are employed in your company? 
As shown in Figure 10.1 the results obtained were grouped to show the different 
types of enterprises. 
 
Figure 10.1: Types of Companies Surveyed. 
9
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Of the sixty-four (64) companies that participated in the survey: 
 9 were micro enterprises (less than 5 employees); 
 23 were small enterprises (less than 50 employees); 
 12 were medium enterprises (less than 200 employees); 
 20 were large enterprises (more than 200 employees). 
These results provided an indication of the types of enterprises that had 
participated in the survey. This information was then used to ensure that the 
interpretations of the results are, in fact, applicable to SMMEs. 
Question 2: Does your company make use of a WLAN? 
 
Figure 10.2: Percentage of Companies Surveyed that had WLANs. 
 88% of micro enterprises made use of WLANs; 
 72% of small enterprises made use of WLANs; 
 73% of medium enterprises made use of WLANs; 
 70% of large enterprises made use of WLANs. 
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A total of 77% of the SMMEs that participated in the survey made use of WLANs. 
Thus, ensuring the security of such WLANs would be of importance to most 
SMME’s. 
Question 3: Does your company have adequate WLAN security? 
 
Figure 10.3: Percentage of Companies that have Adequate WLAN Security. 
 31% of micro enterprises had adequate WLAN security; 
 41% of small enterprises had adequate WLAN security; 
 58% of medium enterprises had adequate WLAN security; 
 59% of large enterprises had adequate WLAN security. 
This reveals that that 71% of the SMMEs that had WLANs did not have adequate 
WLAN security or that the employees were unaware of the type of WLAN security 
controls that existed in their organisation. This lack of WLAN security, in 
combination with the fact that 77% of the SMMEs surveyed used WLANs, clearly 
showed that there was a need for WLAN security amongst SMMEs. 
 
Question 5: Do you think there is a need for better WLAN security in your 
company? 
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Figure 10.4: Percentage of Companies that think there is a Need for Better WLAN Security within 
their Company. 
 100% of micro enterprises indicated there was a need for better WLAN 
security; 
 87% of small enterprises indicated there was a need for better WLAN 
security; 
 92% of medium enterprises indicated there was a need for better WLAN 
security; 
 95% of large enterprises indicated there was a need for better WLAN 
security. 
Figure 10.4 shows that a total of 91% of the SMMEs that participated in the survey 
had indicated that there was a need for better WLAN security controls in their 
companies. 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Micro (9) Small (23) Medium (12) Large (20)
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
C
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s
Types of Companies
Question: Do you think there is a need 
for better WLAN security in your 
company?
NO
YES
  
135 
10.2 Appendix B: Focus Group Validation Presentation and 
Instrument 
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Validation of WLAN Security Control Framework 
Introduction and aim of research study 
The aim of this research study was to develop a Wireless Local Area Network 
(WLAN) Security Control Framework for small, medium and micro sized 
enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. 
Questions: 
1. Please provide a description of your qualifications, work experience and job 
descriptions regarding WLANs and/or information security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The framework is laid out logically and, therefore, easy to understand. Please 
motivate. 
Fully disagree 
Partially 
disagree 
Neutral 
Partially 
agree 
Fully agree 
     
 
Motivation: 
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3. The way in which the framework is used is intuitive and, therefore, a small 
business owner will be able to use it. Please motivate. 
Fully disagree 
Partially 
disagree 
Neutral 
Partially 
agree 
Fully agree 
     
 
Motivation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. For Scenario 1, which was a small legal firm with a hacking problem, sensible 
and appropriate security controls were suggested. Please motivate. 
Fully disagree 
Partially 
disagree 
Neutral 
Partially 
agree 
Fully agree 
     
 
Motivation: 
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5. For Scenario 2, which was a new micro business, sensible and appropriate 
security controls were suggested. Please motivate. 
Fully disagree 
Partially 
disagree 
Neutral 
Partially 
agree 
Fully agree 
     
 
Motivation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Any other comments? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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10.3 Appendix C: Draft Journal Paper 
  
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR WIRELESS SECURITY 
IN SMMEs 
P. VAN DE HAAR, J. VAN NIEKERK 
ABSTRACT 
Many small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) are relying on wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) for communication with customers, suppliers and other businesses. All organisations need 
to protect their information and infrastructure but there is not much literature available that is 
specific to the use of WLAN) security amongst SMMEs in South Africa. 
This research paper seeks to provide assistance to SMMEs for securing their WLANs. The research 
process followed a design science approach in order to produce a solution. Literature studies were 
done on security control framework standards and WLAN technologies. The needs of SMMEs 
regarding WLANs were also established. 
The result of the research process as described in this paper was an artefact in the form of a WLAN 
Security Control Framework for securing WLANs for SMMEs in South Africa.  
Keywords: Framework, WLANs, SMMEs, Information Security 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information technology (IT) is important for modern businesses in the information age where 
information and its’ uses permeate modern life. IT is required to store, control, and manipulate a 
company’s information bringing many benefits. A negative impact would result if IT functions were 
not suitably implemented. IT enables communication and creates opportunities, especially for small 
businesses who are now able to transact with larger organisations due to their ability to 
communicate electronically (Tapscott & Caston, 1993) (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). 
Modern businesses cannot compete unless they have access to information technology resources 
and specifically networking resources (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). This is especially true for 
SMMEs because they have no major information technology divisions in their companies to support 
high availability requirements. SMMEs often use WLANs which brings its’ own set of problems. 
Organisations, both big and small, need to protect themselves against increasing threats that are 
exacerbated by Internet communications (Upfold & Sewry, 2005). 
 
There exists some guidance in the form of international information security best practice control 
framework standards. However, SMMEs do not necessarily have the financial resources available to 
purchase these standards and these standards are not specific to WLANs and more specifically the 
WLAN needs of SMMEs. Thus these standards are not necessarily useful in the context of securing 
WLANs within SMMEs. SMMEs require guidance that is less complex and require fewer resources to 
implement.  Some of these IT security framework standards that companies can use are listed 
below: 
  
 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5 for Information Security 
(ISACA, 2012),  
 International Organisation for Standardization and the International Electro-technical Commission 
(ISO/IEC) 27002:2005 (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005),  
 Information Security Forum (ISF) Standard of Good Practice 2012 (Information Security Forum, 
2012),  
 Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) (Von Bon, 2007), and  
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-100 (NIST, 
2006). 
The next section describes the research methodology used for the artefact presented in this paper. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The research process followed a Design Science methodology, using induction to collect information 
for developing a framework. Qualitative data was collected by means of literature reviews, 
observations and experience. The framework was validated using a focus group. 
For the purpose of this research design science was chosen as the overarching philosophical 
paradigm. Design science is about developing something, in this case a WLAN Security Control 
Framework (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004).   
This research used inductive reasoning, which means that the information was collected and the 
framework was developed as a result. Further induction was applied when the framework was 
validated. 
Qualitative research suited this particular research topic because the sources of data were mostly 
textual.  Information was also collected through experience and theoretical knowledge of the 
researcher. Qualitative content analyses were conducted. The researcher would have remained 
objective when doing this qualitative research to build the framework (Bhattacherjee, 2012) (Myers, 
1997) (Olivier, 2009). 
Rigour research arguments were prepared in adherence to guidelines presented by Mason (2002) 
for evidential or interpretive arguments. The framework that was developed contained concepts, 
theories and expectations to support and inform SMMEs about securing WLANs. The contents of the 
framework were as a result of the data collection techniques as well as the researcher’s knowledge, 
experiences and observation of SMMEs (Krippendorff, 2004). 
In order to validate the framework, the research study adopted a focus group method. This allowed 
a  multi-disciplinary validation in order to satisfy the requirements for information security 
knowledge, networking knowledge, and general research experience. 
The next section describes some of the information gained during the literature reviews. 
  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 WLAN Technologies 
Every business has information that is of strategic importance and also has a requirement to 
communicate with customers, suppliers, and other businesses. Information technology (IT), and 
networks in particular, are therefore important enablers. IT networks provides the facility for 
borderless communication and brings businesses closer together removing the distance barriers 
(Tapscott & Caston, 1993). 
There are many types of IT networks that businesses may use. Local area networks (LANs) are 
usually a group of computers connected together in the same building. Computers in wide area 
networks (WANs) may be further apart and connected by telephone lines or radio waves because of 
the far distances. There are other types of networks in-between LANs and WANs such as campus 
area networks (CANs), and metropolitan area networks (MANs) (Baumann, 2002). 
All of these IT networks can be built using either wired or wireless technologies. This research study 
focused on wireless local area networks (WLANs).  
In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) developed a set of standards 
required for implementing WLAN communication between computers and pre-existing networks, 
including home and office networks, and the Internet. In the decade and a half since its release, 
WLANs have matured and grown immensely in capability, changing the face of computing, and 
communication in the world at large. However, WLANs have also become a large, confusing list of 
standards, tethered to the past by necessary backwards compatibility (Rackley, 2011).  
WLANs bring specific information security related responsibilities. This section will discuss the 
various threats that are facing WLANs (Information Security Forum, 2012). 
 Malware threats - The threat of malware to a WLAN is caused by malicious software, which 
has been developed for the purpose of compromising information and harming WLAN devices. 
 Hacking threats - The threats of WLANs being hacked involve unauthorised external 
individuals deliberately attempting to access or harm an organisation’s network by exploiting 
vulnerabilities and bypassing security controls. 
 Social engineering threats - The threat of social engineering involves the use of social tactics 
to exploit an individual and influence them in performing specific actions such as disclosing 
WLAN authentication information. 
 Misuse threats - The threat of misuse involves the unauthorised use of resources and 
privileges to gain access to information on a WLAN. 
 Physical threats - Physical threats are typically associated with the loss or theft of WLAN 
equipment. 
 Error threats - Error threats to WLANs are usually the result of mistakes made by one or more 
individuals. 
  
 Environmental threats - Environmental threats are typically associated with WLANs being 
affected by natural events, such as floods or storms, or man-made events, such as fires, 
explosions, riots or electrical interference. 
The three main goals of WLAN security are to protect an organisation from the loss of 
confidentiality, the loss of integrity and the loss of availability. Most security practices and controls 
can be traced back to protecting against the losses in one or more of these areas. These areas are 
often referred to as the CIA triad and they are the core principles of information security (ISO/IEC 
27002, 2005): 
 Confidentiality ensures that WLAN data is not disclosed to unauthorised users. 
 Integrity ensures that WLAN data is correct and current. 
 Availability ensures that WLAN devices and data are available when needed. 
Organisation’s should be aware that any flaws when protecting against the loss of CIA can be 
exploited for malicious purposes, so when organisation’s secure their WLANs they need to consider 
three different types of security. These are physical security, technical security and operational 
security (Wong & Yeung, 2009). 
3.2 WLAN Technologies in SMMEs 
It is estimated that 91% of businesses in South Africa are small, medium and micro size enterprises 
(SMMEs) and they account for between 52% and 57% of South Africa’s gross domestic product (Abor 
& Quartey, 2010). This comprises a large portion of the South African economy and therefore these 
businesses should be protected appropriately to ensure their sustainability. 
As can be seen in the Table 1, micro-sized enterprises have from 1 to 5 employees, small-sized 
enterprises have from 6 to 50 employees and medium-sized enterprises have from 51 to 200 
employees. Enterprises with more than 200 employees will be regarded as large enterprises and 
will not be included in the scope of this study. 
Table 1: Enterprise classifications used in this dissertation. 
Size of Class The total full-time employees 
Micro enterprises 1-5 employees 
Small enterprises 6-50 
Medium enterprises 51-200 
Large enterprises More than 200 
 
In the past, WLANs have been seen as a slow and unreliable network standard (Chen, Katsaros, 
Nanopoulos, & Manolopoulos, 2005). The 802.11g standard, which was ratified in 2003, is now seen 
as inadequate because applications have become more complex and require more bandwidth. The 
802.11g standard struggled to do streaming of video data efficiently because of the speeds that it 
offered. 
The new 802.11ac standard, which was ratified in 2012, uses newer technologies and tweaks the 
existing technologies to give WLANs more speed and range. The speed obtainable when using 
802.11ac is up to 1300Mbps making WLANs a sustainable choice for SMMEs (Eldad & Stacey, 2013).  
  
The benefits of using WLANs in SMMEs are the following (Chandra, et al., 2009): 
 Mobility - WLAN users have the ability to access shared resources without looking for a place 
to plug in, anywhere in the organisation. A WLAN allows users to be truly mobile as long as 
the WLAN device is within the network coverage area. 
 Range of coverage - The range of a typical WLAN access point is about 100 metres. WLAN 
access points can extend the cover of an area in such a way that the range of coverage overlaps 
each other providing roaming. Thereby the WLAN user can wander around and move from 
the coverage area of one access point to another while maintaining seamless connection 
within the network. 
 Ease of use – WLANs are easy to use and the users need minimum experience to take 
advantage of them. 
 Flexibility – The installation of a WLAN infrastructure can be fast and easy and can eliminate 
the need to pull cable through walls and ceilings. WLANs can be set up where wires may be 
impossible to install. 
 Scalability – WLANs can be designed to be extremely simple or complex. They can support 
large numbers of WLAN devices and large physical areas by adding access points to extend 
coverage. 
 Cost – The cost of installing and maintaining a WLAN is on average lower than the cost of 
installing and maintaining a traditional wired LAN. This is because WLANs eliminate the direct 
costs of cabling and the labour associated with installing and repairing it. WLANs also are 
simple to move and change which reduces the ongoing administrative costs. 
When comparing the benefits that WLANs bring to an SMME against the total cost of ownership 
(TCO) it can be seen that using WLANs can bring more value to a business, provided that the WLAN is 
secured and managed properly (Cisco Systems, Inc, 2003). 
The securing and management of WLANs is therefore important and requires much attention 
especially in view of the fact that WLANs tend to be exposed to more threats than wired networks.  
SMMEs in particular do not usually have on-site security support personnel and may not have funds 
to outsource WLAN security functions. This implies the lack of the required knowledge, skills and 
resources in SMMEs pertaining to securing WLANs. 
It will therefore be more useful for SMMEs to have access to guidelines which may be derived from 
accepted international information security control frameworks and standards and then be used for 
their own in-house implementation and securing of WLANs. 
  
3.3 Information Security Control Frameworks 
When implementing something in the correct manner and ensuring effectiveness, it is useful to have 
a benchmark that has been developed using international best practices. With regards to 
information security there are many security control framework standards which are recognised 
internationally as providing useful guidelines for adequate implementation of information security in 
organisations. By using a recognised information security framework one can ensure confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of all information technology (IT) assets within an organisation. 
A control framework is a “structured way of categorising controls to ensure the whole spectrum of a 
control is covered adequately” (ISACA, 2012). A number of information security control frameworks 
have already been listed further above in this paper. 
The information security control frameworks listed all have implications on the objectives of this 
research study. However, due to the magnitude of the research involved in analysing each 
framework only three were selected. The control frameworks selected are COBIT 5 for Information 
Security, ISO/IEC 27002 and ISF Standard of Good Practice. The COBIT 5 framework was selected 
because it is the only framework for governance and management of business and IT. The ISO/IEC 
27002 was selected because it gives detailed guidelines for information security practices and it is 
widely used amongst organisations. The ISF Standard of Good Practice was selected because the 
body that created it is seen as the world’s leading authority on information security and the ISF is 
made up of thousands of information security specialists worldwide.  
Going through these information security control framework standards it can clearly be seen that 
they are aimed at larger organisations. For example, COBIT 5 BAI05 requires a qualified information 
security professional to serve on all IT implementation teams. ISO 27002 A.6 Organization 
Information Security states that information security activities should be co-ordinated by 
representatives with relevant expert roles and job functions. ISO 27002 A.15 Compliance indicates 
that a specific data protection officer should provide guidance to managers on the responsibilities 
and specific procedures that should be followed. ISF SoGP SG1.1 requires that a full time Chief 
Information Security Officer be appointed in the organisation. In ISF SoGP SR2.1, it requires the 
establishment of a high-level working group to manage information privacy issues. 
While these specialized information security personnel may be found in larger organisations, small 
organisations would not typically have an employee dedicated to these tasks. 
The information security control frameworks researched in this study were therefore not specifically 
created with small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in mind. The frameworks are 
exhaustive and therefore not suitable for SMMEs. They were aimed at larger corporations and are 
not freely available, requiring extensive resources to purchase. The controls in the frameworks are 
typically aimed at experienced security professionals such as Information Security Officers. They are 
too complex for ordinary SMME staff to understand and implement. Adding to this, the control 
frameworks are not specifically related to securing WLANs although there may be a few controls 
that can be made applicable. 
4. A WLAN SECURITY CONTROL FRAMEWORK FOR SMMES 
In this section the WLAN Security Control Framework for SMMEs is presented. The framework 
consists of a control matrix table and detailed control tables for physical, technical and operational 
security. However, for the sake of brevity, detailed control tables were removed and only the control 
matrix table is presented here and appended with reference to the information security control 
frameworks which were used as sources of information. 
  
In order to explain how the WLAN Security Control Framework was developed, a walkthrough will be 
demonstrated below. 
1. Take the example of “APO07: Manage Human Resources” from COBIT. 
2. A control activity for securing WLANs in SMMEs was created having looked at APO07. This 
control activity was defined as “Train staff on the general risks of WLANs”. 
3. A control objective was derived “To provide staff with the skills required to protect against 
the general risks of WLANs” and a detailed description was provided for the control activity. 
4. Decision was made as to which general security area this falls under, namely, physical security, 
technical security, or operational security. 
5. A reference code was added to the control activity name, in this case “PS04” as it falls under 
physical security (PS). 
6. A relevance indication was added i.e. Fundamental (F) if it is applicable to all organisations or 
Specialised (S) if it is applicable to only specific organisations. PS04 is of fundamental 
relevance. 
7. SMME classification was provided to indicate whether this is applicable to micro, small and/or 
medium enterprises. PS04 is applicable to small and medium enterprises. 
8. The threats that may be possibly mitigated by this control activity were indicated. In this case, 
PS04 can mitigate social engineering, physical, and environmental threats. 
9. Finally, all the original information security control framework references were provided to 
allow the reader to investigate more detail regarding the control activity. In this case, APO07 
from COBIT 5 is similar to A.8 and A.9 from ISO 27002, and CF2 from ISF SoGP. 
10. These steps were repeated for all the COBIT 5 domains, ISO 27002 clauses, and ISF SoGP 
categories deemed applicable to securing WLANs in SMMEs. 
All of the information described above can be found in a summary control matrix for the WLAN 
Security Control Framework. Further detailed information for the thirty-six control activities were 
also created  and they list the Physical Security (PS), Technical Security (TS), and Operational Security 
(OS) detail for the framework respectively. 
Note: The order of the security areas in this WLAN Security Control Framework does not imply their 
importance. All security areas are important therefore each organisation should apply the control 
activities that are applicable to their size. 
In Figure 1, the links are depicted between the information security control frameworks and the 
three security areas. All the control frameworks had components that were relevant to all the 
security areas used in the WLAN Security Control Framework.  The framework is shown in Table 2. 
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Figure 1: From Information Security Control Frameworks to Security Areas adopted in the WLAN Security 
Control Framework 
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PS01 
Secure antennas and related cabling 
supporting WLANs. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF19 
 
 ✔   ✔  ✔ 
PS02 Secure WLAN access points. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF19 
 
    ✔  ✔ 
PS03 Secure WLAN client devices. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.7, A.9, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF14, CF19 
 
    ✔  ✔ 
PS04 
Train staff on the general risks of 
WLANs. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: APO07 
ISO 27002: A.8, A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF2 
 
  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
PS05 Control access to secure areas. S   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05, MEA02 
ISO 27002: A.9, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF19 
 
  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
PS06 Conduct regular WLAN site surveys. S   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔ ✔     
  
PS07 
Secure antennas as to minimise 
coverage. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔      
PS08 
Deploy redundant WLAN access 
points. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: BAI04 
ISO 27002: A.14 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF20 
 
    ✔  ✔ 
PS09 Secure backups. F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS04 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7 
 
   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
PS10 Protect WLAN access points with UPS. F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS01 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF19 
 
     ✔ ✔ 
 
TS01 Secure the SSID. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS02 Configure authentication. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8, CF9 
 
 ✔      
TS03 Configure MAC address filtering. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔      
TS04 
Secure default WLAN access point 
settings. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF7 
 
 ✔      
TS05 
Require a valid password prior to 
administrator access. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF14 
 
 ✔  ✔  ✔  
TS06 Configure user accounts. F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05, DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6 
 
 ✔  ✔    
  
TS07 
Disable unused and dormant user 
accounts. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: APO07, DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.8, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF2, CF6 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS08 Configure strong passwords. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS09 
Disable responses to broadcast SSID 
probe. 
S   ✔ ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔      
TS10 Perform user identification. F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF8 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS11 
Segregate WLANs from internal 
network. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
 
✔ ✔      
TS12 
Secure gateways prior to accessing the 
internal network. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF9 
 
✔ ✔      
TS13 
Secure management interface on 
WLAN access points. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS14 Secure SNMP. F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔  ✔    
TS15 Enable WPA2 encryption. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.11 
ISF SoGP: CF9 
 
 ✔      
TS16 Encrypt WLAN devices. F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.9 
ISF SoGP: CF14 
 
 ✔   ✔   
TS17 
Encrypt data using high level 
protocols. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.10 
 
 ✔      
  
 ISF SoGP: CF9 
TS18 Update WLAN device firmware. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS05 
ISO 27002: A.12 
ISF SoGP: CF10 
 
✔ ✔      
 
OS01 
Direct and monitor the WLAN Security 
Control Framework. 
F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: EDM01, APO13 
ISO 27002: A.5 
ISF SoGP: SG1 
 
   ✔    
OS02 Document a WLAN Security Policy. F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: APO01 
ISO 27002: A.5 
ISF SoGP: CF1 
 
   ✔    
OS03 
Distribute WPA2 encryption keys 
when changed. 
F ✔ ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS06 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF9 
 
     ✔  
OS04 Audit WLAN access points. F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: MEA02 
ISO 27002: A.10, A.15 
ISF SoGP: SI1 
 
 ✔  ✔    
OS05 Review log files. F  ✔ ✔ 
COBIT 5: MEA02 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: SI1, CF10 
 
 ✔  ✔  ✔  
OS06 
Store WLAN access point firmware 
versions. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: BAI10 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF9, CF14 
 
     ✔  
OS07 Store WLAN information. F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: BAI10 
ISO 27002: A.10 
ISF SoGP: CF6, CF9 
 
     ✔  
OS08 
Establish a data backup and recovery 
plan. 
F   ✔ 
COBIT 5: DSS04 
ISO 27002: A.14 
ISF SoGP: CF7, CF20 
 
   ✔  ✔ ✔ 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented the WLAN Security Control Framework for SMMEs. 
The WLAN Security Control Framework was developed from a number of international standards, 
namely, COBIT 5 for Information Security (COBIT 5), ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (ISO 27002) and the ISF 
Standard of Good Practice 2012 (ISF SoGP). The contents of the framework were separated into 
three security areas, namely, Physical Security, Technical Security, and Operational Security. Each 
item in the framework presented controls that assist in mitigating identified threats to SMMEs in 
South Africa. 
The validation of the framework was done using a focus group. The main aim of the focus group was 
to ascertain whether this research study has contributed in addressing the gaps identified in current 
approaches for securing WLANs in small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs).  
At the end of this validation it was concluded that the WLAN Security Control Framework was 
logically set out, easy to use, recommended sensible and appropriate controls for the given 
scenarios and was thus deemed to have served its purpose. The researcher does however take 
cognisance of the fact that certain small businesses might require training in the use of the 
framework. 
The results from the focus group therefore agreed that this research study contributed in addressing 
the identified gaps in current approaches for securing WLANs in SMMEs. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the developed WLAN Security Control Framework was deemed valid. 
 
